U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission<\/a> for 20 years?. Will this Committee just be another \u201cdog and pony\u201d show to demonstrate that Congress is taking the threat China poses to the U.S. more seriously?<\/p>\n\n\n\nFor those of you who have never heard of such a Commission, it \u201cwas created on October 30, 2000 by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106\u2013398 (codified at 22 U.S.C. \u00a77002) \u2026\u201d This was after China was granted \u201cMost Favored Nation\u201d status, now known as Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) and allowed to become a member of the World Trade Organization by President Clinton.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The stated \u201cpurpose of the Commission is to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People\u2019s Republic of China. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The main duty of the Commission is to provide an annual report to Congress \u2014 \u201cNot later than December 1 each year (beginning in 2002), the Commission shall submit to Congress a report, in both unclassified and classified form, regarding the national security implications and impact of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People\u2019s Republic of China. The report shall include a full analysis, along with conclusions and recommendations for legislative and administrative actions, if any, of the national security implications for the United States of the trade and current balances with the People\u2019s Republic of China in goods and services, financial transactions, and technology transfers\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Each report was required to include full discussion of key factors of the U.S.-China relationship that are very comprehensive. The following briefly summarizes the key factors:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(A) \u201cThe role of the People\u2019s Republic of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other weapon systems\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(B) \u201cThe qualitative and quantitative nature of the transfer of United States production activities to the People\u2019s Republic of China, including the relocation of manufacturing, advanced technology and intellectual property, and research and development facilities\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(C) \u201cThe effects of the need for energy and natural resources in the People\u2019s Republic of China on the foreign and military policies of the People\u2019s Republic of China, the impact of the large and growing economy of the People\u2019s Republic of China on world energy and natural resource supplies, prices, and the environment\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(D) \u201cForeign investment by the United States in the People\u2019s Republic of China and by the People\u2019s Republic of China in the United States\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(E) \u201cThe military plans, strategy and doctrine of the People\u2019s Republic of China\u2026and the implications of such objectives and trends for the national security of the United States.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(F) \u201cThe strategic economic and security implications of the cyber capabilities and operations of the People\u2019s Republic of China. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(G) \u201cThe national budget, fiscal policy, monetary policy, capital controls, and currency management practices of the People\u2019s Republic of China, their impact on internal stability in the People\u2019s Republic of China, and their implications for the United States.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(H) \u201cThe drivers, nature, and implications of the growing economic, technological, political, cultural, people-to-people, and security relations of the People\u2019s Republic of China\u2019s with other countries, regions, and international and regional entities\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(I) \u201cThe compliance of the People\u2019s Republic of China with its commitments to the World Trade Organization, other multilateral commitments, bilateral agreements signed with the United States, commitments made to bilateral science and technology programs, and any other commitments and agreements strategic to the United States (including agreements on intellectual property rights and prison labor imports), and United States enforcement policies with respect to such agreements.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(J) \u201cThe implications of restrictions on speech and access to information in the People\u2019s Republic of China for its relations with the United States in economic and security policy, as well as any potential impact of media control by the People\u2019s Republic of China on United States economic interests.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(K) \u201cThe safety of food, drug, and other products imported from China\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The report was also required to \u201cinclude recommendations for action by Congress or the President, or both, including specific recommendations for the United States to invoke Article XXI (relating to security exceptions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 with respect to the People\u2019s Republic of China, as a result of any adverse impact on the national security interests of the United States. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2022 Annual Report<\/a> to Congress was submitted on November 15, 2022 to Patrick Leahy
President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate and Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. \u201cThe Commission conducted seven public hearings, taking testimony from 74 expert witnesses from government, the private sector, academia, think tanks, research institutions, and other
backgrounds.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nThis report contained the following chapters:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Chapter 1 – CCP Decision-Making and Xi Jinping\u2019s Centralization of Authority<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Chapter 2 – U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations<\/p>\n\n\n\n