{"id":993,"date":"2020-08-04T16:02:30","date_gmt":"2020-08-04T23:02:30","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/?p=993"},"modified":"2020-08-04T16:02:30","modified_gmt":"2020-08-04T23:02:30","slug":"u-s-must-stop-trafficking-of-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/general\/u-s-must-stop-trafficking-of-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods\/","title":{"rendered":"U.S. Must Stop Trafficking of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One of the dangers of reliance on\nforeign manufacturers is the increase of U.S. vulnerability to receiving\ncounterfeit goods. &nbsp;Over the last ten years, there have been\nseveral reports prepared to determine the extent of the infiltration of\ncounterfeits into U.S. defense and industrial supply chains, to provide an\nunderstanding of industry and government practices that contribute to the\nproblem, and to identify best practices and recommendations for handling and\npreventing counterfeit electronics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bis.doc.gov\/index.php\/documents\/technology-evaluation\/37-defense-industrial-base-assessment-of-counterfeit-electronics-2010\/file\">first<\/a>\nwas the Defense Industrial Base Assessment: Counterfeit Electronics prepared by\nthe U.S. Department of Commerce on January 2010as a result of a three-year\nstudy. \u201cThis assessment focused on discrete electronic components,\nmicrocircuits, and circuit board products \u2013 key elements of electronic systems\nthat support national security, industrial, and commercial missions and\noperations. A few of the findings of the study were:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>all elements of the supply chain have been\ndirectly impacted by counterfeit electronics<\/li><li>companies and organizations assume that others\nin the supply chain are testing parts; <\/li><li>lack of traceability in the supply chain is\ncommonplace<\/li><li>there is an insufficient chain of accountability\nwithin organizations <\/li><li>recordkeeping on counterfeit incidents by\norganizations is very limited<\/li><li>most DOD organizations do not have policies in\nplace to prevent counterfeit parts from infiltrating their supply chain <\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Bureau of Industry and Security\u2019s (BIS) Office of Technology Evaluation\n(OTE) made the following key recommendations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Consider establishing a centralized federal\nreporting mechanism for collecting information on suspected\/confirmed\ncounterfeit parts for use by industry and all federal agencies<\/li><li>Modify Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR),\nincluding Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFAR), to allow for \u201cbest\nvalue\u201d procurement<\/li><li>Require U.S. Government suppliers and federal\nagencies to systematically report counterfeit electronic parts to the national\nfederal reporting mechanism; <\/li><li>Issue clear, unambiguous legal guidance to\nindustry and U.S. federal agencies with respect to civil and criminal liabilities,\nreporting and handling requirements<\/li><li>Establish federal guidance for the destruction,\nrecycling, and\/or disposal of electronic systems and parts sold and consumed in\nthe United States<\/li><li>Consider establishing a government data\nrepository of electronic parts information and for disseminating best practices\nto limit the infiltration of counterfeits into supply chains<\/li><li>Develop international agreements covering\ninformation sharing, supply chain integrity, border inspection of electronic\nparts shipped to and from their countries, related law enforcement cooperation,\nand standards for inspecting suspected\/confirmed counterfeits<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, implementing these recommendations didn\u2019t solve the problem.&nbsp; On May 21, 2012, the U.S. Senate Armed\nServices Committee released a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.armed-services.senate.gov\/press-releases\/senate-armed-services-committee-releases-report-on-counterfeit-electronic-parts\">report<\/a>\nas a result of a congressional investigation into counterfeit goods.&nbsp; \u201cThe year-long investigation launched by Sen.\nCarl Levin, D-Mich., the committee\u2019s chairman, and Ranking Member Sen. John\nMcCain, R-Ariz., found a total number of suspect counterfeit parts involved in\nthose 1,800 cases exceeding 1 million.\u201d Counterfeit electronic parts \u201cwere\nuncovered in items ranging from night vision equipment to Global Positioning\nSystem (GPS) navigation modules.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Committee \u201cdiscovered counterfeit electronic parts from China in the Air\nForce\u2019s largest cargo plane, in assemblies intended for Special Operations\nhelicopters, and in a Navy surveillance plane among 1,800 cases of bogus parts.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cOur report outlines how this flood of counterfeit parts, overwhelmingly\nfrom China, threatens national security, the safety of our troops and American\njobs,\u201d Levin said. \u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a result, \u201cthe Committee adopted an amendment to the FY12 National\nDefense Authorization Act (NDAA) to \u201caddress weaknesses in the defense supply\nchain and to promote the adoption of aggressive counterfeit avoidance practices\nby DoD and the defense industry.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the next four years, progress was made as shown by the follow-up <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gao.gov\/assets\/680\/675227.pdf\">report<\/a> to Congress of February\n2016 Government Accountability Office (GAO), which &nbsp;\u201cfound that while the number of counterfeit\nparts in the DoD supply chain decreased significantly between 2011 and 2015,\nthere were still nearly 50 parts per year that were identified as being\ncounterfeit.&nbsp; As a percentage of total parts, this was a mere .006% of the\nDoD supply chain.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, a single counterfeit part can have a disastrous impact and\nidentifying counterfeit parts is extremely difficult when they are deliberately\nmanufactured to pass as the \u201creal deal.\u201d Moreover, the threat of counterfeit\nparts being introduced by U.S. adversaries, such as China, has increased, and\nthese foreign companies are good at figuring out ways to make their\ncounterfeits blend in with other components.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Counterfeit goods are not limited to the defense and industrial supply\nchain.&nbsp; The January 24, 2020 report to the President of the United States, \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dhs.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/publications\/20_0124_plcy_counterfeit-pirated-goods-report_01.pdf\">Combating Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated\nGoods<\/a>,\u201d states,\n\u201cCounterfeiting is no longer confined to street-corners and flea markets. The\nproblem has intensified to staggering levels\u2026information collected by the U.S.\nDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) between 2000 and 2018 shows that seizures\nof infringing goods at U.S. borders have increased 10-fold, from 3,244 seizures\nper year to 33,810.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This report recommended the following immediate\nactions for the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">1.\u201d Ensure Entities with Financial\nInterests in Imports Bear Responsibility<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">2. Increase Scrutiny of\nSection 321 Environment<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">3. Suspend and Debar\nRepeat Offenders; Act Against Non-Compliant International Posts<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">4. Apply Civil Fines,\nPenalties and Injunctive Actions for Violative Imported Products<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">5. Leverage Advance\nElectronic Data for Mail Mode<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">6. Anti-Counterfeiting\nConsortium to Identify Online Nefarious Actors (ACTION) Plan<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">7. Analyze Enforcement\nResources<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">8. Create Modernized\nE-Commerce Enforcement Framework <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">9. Assess Contributory\nTrademark Infringement Liability for Platforms<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">10. Re-Examine the Legal\nFramework Surrounding Non-Resident Importers<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">11. Establish a National\nConsumer Awareness Campaign\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These recommendations were very timely since there\nhas been a big problem with counterfeit pharmaceuticals, personal protective\nequipment (PPE), and medical devices during the COVID-19 pandemic this year.\nCounterfeit goods in the healthcare industry can cause immediate loss of lives\njust like counterfeit parts in the defense industry can cause loss of life for\nour military personnel in defending our country. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since taking office in January 2017, President Trump\nhas issued three Executive Orders strengthening different aspects of the Buy\nAmerican Act of 1933:&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EO 13788: \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/presidential-executive-order-buy-american-hire-american\/\">Buy American and Hire American<\/a>,\u201d April 18, 2017 <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EO 13858: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/executive-order-strengthening-buy-american-preferences-infrastructure-projects\/\">Strengthening Buy-American\nPreferences for Infrastructure Projects<\/a>,\u201d January 31 2019 <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EO 13881:\u2013 \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/executive-order-maximizing-use-american-made-goods-products-materials\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Maximizing\nUse of American-Made Goods, Products, and Materials<\/a>,\u201d July 15, 2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I laud the President\u2019s focus on strengthening the\nBuy American Act, but the best way to eliminate the problem of counterfeit\ngoods is to return manufacturing to America of all critical goods for our\ndefense and military, as well as our pharmaceutical, PPE, and medical device\nindustries.&nbsp; This is referred to as\n\u201creshoring\u201d by Harry Moser, who founded the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.reshorenow.org\">Reshoring Initiative<\/a> in 2010. In an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.assemblymag.com\/articles\/94752-made-in-usa-turning-preference-into-purchases-part-1\">article<\/a> for Assembly magazine of\nFebruary 12, 2019, Harry Moser wrote: \u201cThe Reshoring Initiative has aggregated\nconsumer surveys from 10 sources, gleaning insight into the preferences of more\nthan 14,000 U.S. consumers. Findings show that there is a decisive preference\nfor U.S.-made goods: 97 percent have a positive view of goods manufactured in\nthe U.S. Americans also have a positive opinion of companies that manufacture\nin the U.S.: 91 percent believe it is important to manufacture in the U.S. and\nthink the government should take steps to support American manufacturing.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Only Made in USA products will be able to provide\nconfidence in the quality of the products, but government agencies, the health\ncare industry, and consumers need to know where products are being made to make\nthe choice of buying Made in USA products. Currently, there are limitations of\ncounty of origin labeling on products, and no information is provided for\nproducts sold on the internet and through catalogs.&nbsp; We must address this situation if we are\ntruly going to be able to stop trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods.&nbsp; <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>One of the dangers of reliance on foreign manufacturers is the increase of U.S. vulnerability to receiving counterfeit goods. &nbsp;Over the last ten years, there have been several reports prepared to determine the extent of the infiltration of counterfeits into U.S. defense and industrial supply chains, to provide an understanding of industry and government practices [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[10,11,13,272],"class_list":["post-993","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general","tag-buy-american","tag-american-manufacturing","tag-chinese-counterfeit-parts","tag-made-in-america"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/993","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=993"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/993\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":994,"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/993\/revisions\/994"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=993"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=993"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/savingusmanufacturing.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=993"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}