The Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) was first signed on June 30, 2007, with a renegotiated version signed in early December 4, 2010. However, the agreement has not yet been ratified by the United States Congress or the National Assembly of South Korea and thus has not become in force.
After being stalled for more than four years, the treaty is once again being considered in Congress, and supporters had hoped it would be ratified shortly after many of the objections has been addressed in the renegotiated version.
The original negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, which Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002. (P.L. 107-210). The authority allowed the President to enter into trade agreements that receive expedited congressional consideration with no amendments and limited debate. The fast-track trade authority under TPA expired on July 1, 2007 and has not been renewed.
The December 2010 deal represented a compromise between the two sides. Significant concessions were granted to the U.S. on trade in automobiles: tariff reductions for Korean automobiles were delayed for five years, and U.S. autos were granted broader access to the Korean market. At the same time, the negotiators agreed to set aside disagreements over U.S. beef exports for the time being.
The agreement would eventually eliminate tariffs between the two countries. Because those levies are typically higher on the South Korean side, administration officials estimate the deal could mean more than $10 billion annually in increased U.S. exports to Seoul and tens of thousands of new U.S. jobs. South Koreans say they would benefit from lower prices — some tariffs on food imports from the U.S. are as high as 40 percent — and a more efficient flow of investment in and out of their country.
The deal was supported by Ford Motor Company, as well as the United Auto Workers, both of which had previously opposed the agreement. With widespread support from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, the Obama administration expected approval in both houses to be easy.
However, on Thursday, June 30, 2011, several Senate Republicans boycotted a preliminary hearing on free trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia and Panama by staging a simultaneous press conference and bringing the stop-and-go process to yet another halt.
While Republican senators stood before television cameras to declare that they would not allow a hearing on legislation that much of their own base strongly supports, Democratic senators filled half a hearing room to declare their support for trade deals opposed by much of their party’s political base.
Senator Orrin Hatch, the ranking Republican on the Finance Committee, said Republicans were responding to a decision by the White House to include in the free trade legislation the expansion of a benefits program for workers who lose jobs to foreign competition, known as Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). During the portion of the press conference I heard, Republicans stated that part of the funds to provide TAA would come from a $400 million cut to Medicare funding for “imaging” for seniors such as MRIs, Cat scans, etc., and they objected to taking this funding from Medicare to partially fund TAA.
Senate Republicans had not been included in a deal with House Republicans and Senate Democrats over the terms of the benefits program. An expansion of TAA passed by Democrats in 2009 expired at the beginning of this year, and the deal would reinstate about 60 percent of the lapsed financing ($964 million) for an additional two years. Democrats had demanded the deal as a condition of their support for the trade agreements. House Republicans had agreed after several weeks of negotiations.
It seems to me that the fight over Trade-Adjustment Assistance is a tacit admission by both sides that this treaty will put more American on the unemployment rolls; i.e., Republicans would not oppose it unless they felt displaced workers would use it and Democrats would not support it unless they felt displaced workers would use it. Historically, trade agreements do displace workers, and the effects of other trade agreements have shown that more American jobs are lost than gained.
Just before the Senate Finance Committee convened Thursday afternoon to consider the legislation, the Republican members invoked Senate rules to prevent the meeting. After all the Democrats spoke, they got up and left. Senator Orrin Hatch said, “We made it clear time and time and time again that we would not stomach attaching a big government spending program onto these agreements. “The president knew where we stood, and he decided to ignore those who don’t agree with him.”
The Obama administration planned to submit that deal as part of KORUS to give Democrats the assurance that it will rise or fall with the agreement. House Republicans say they will hold separate votes on the trade pact and the benefits program. Because Senate Republicans lack the power to set the terms of debate, they said that their actions were an assertion of the rights of the minority party to be heard and respected. Republicans cannot prevent the legislation from leaving the committee, but they can delay it.
This delay is a good time to reconsider whether KORUS and the other pending trade agreements with Panama and Chile should be ratified by Congress. The fundamental dispute is over free trade itself. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush aggressively promoted it, while President Obama promised more protection for American workers in future agreements when he was a candidate.
The appeal of free trade has waned amid large U.S. trade deficits and concerns that more American manufacturing jobs will disappear overseas at a time when unemployment remains stuck above nine percent
The mistake many people make is lumping free trade, free enterprise, and free markets together, whereas each has its own specific meaning. In simple terms, free trade allows faster and more business between two countries/regions by agreeing to lift tariffs, quotas, special fees and taxes, and other barriers to trade between the two entities. Free enterprise is the freedom a company has to select the headquarters and manufacturing locations to make its product as inexpensively as it can, regardless of where that might be, in order to enjoy continued profitability and remain viable. Of course, a company is subject to the laws of the country in which they are located. A free market is a one in which economic intervention and regulation by the state is limited to tax collection, and enforcement of private ownership and contracts, relying on supply and demand.
The underlying economic theory of free trade agreements is that of “comparative advantage,” which originated in an 1817 book entitled “On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation” by British political economist David Ricardo. He postulated that in a free marketplace, each country/area will ultimately specialize in that activity where it has comparative advantage; i.e., natural resources, skilled artisans, agriculture-friendly weather, etc. The result should be that all parties to the agreement should increase their income. Unfortunately there are winners and losers if the “comparative advantage” of one country is unequal to the other.
Advocates of free trade argue that it is essential to our country’s growth and point out that the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) and other trade agreements have created more than 20 million jobs around the world since their passage.
Opponents to free trade argue that the U.S. has lost over six million jobs to offshore countries since 1994 when NAFTA was passed. Furthermore, they make the point that American jobs are not being supported when we buy products that have been made offshore, and that the U.S. should not encourage and even facilitate its corporations to ship jobs out of the country. They believe that manufacturing is the foundation of the U.S. economy and that American jobs must be protected from being outsourced to other countries.
The reality is that we don’t really have free trade – we have negotiated trade agreements in which the United States has gotten “the short end of the stick” in most cases. Instead of free trade, I would say that we have “dumb” or “stupid” trade instead of free trade. What we need is “smart” trade.
For example, over 150 countries have a value added tax (VAT), and the United States doesn’t have a VAT. A VAT is a tax on consumption – as opposed to income, wealth, property or wages. It is s a tax only on the “value added” to a product, material or service, from an accounting view, at every stage of its manufacture or distribution. VATs are “border adjustable” and average about 17%. This means that virtually all foreign countries tax our exports with their 17% VATs, when our goods cross into their country. While those countries tax their domestic production as well, they rebate their VAT when their companies export. This means that American imports to our trading partners are charged a VAT while we don’t charge a similar VAT on imports of their products to our country. Thus, American companies are victims of unfair competition when trying to penetrate foreign markets.
VATs are the biggest trade problem for the U.S. globally. Trade agreements do not address VATs when tariffs are lowered. The WTO allows VATs. During the last 40 years, the U.S. has lowered tariffs, and other countries lowered tariffs. However, other countries implemented and raised their VATs. The net result is that other countries replaced tariffs with VATs, but the U.S. did not. No trade barrier costs us more money. Our exports are double taxed – once in the U.S. and once upon arrival at a foreign country’s shores. Foreign sales to us are partially tax free.
In addition, U.S. opponents of the agreement argue it doesn’t do enough to benefit American industry while it gives South Korean businesses greater rights in the United States. The organizations taking the lead in opposing KORUS are: Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA), Alliance for American Manufacturing, Economy in Crisis, and the U. S. Business & Industry Council.
What’s missing in the list of organizations that oppose trade agreements is one that truly represents American workers, who will suffer the most from the effects of KORUS just as they have from past agreements. Today, union membership only represents 12 percent of the private sector workforce, which means that 88 percent of private sector workers have no organization to voice their opinions on trade issues. Many small businesses and industries that have been harmed by past trade agreements were never unionized, such as high technology companies making computers, electronics equipment, medical devices, and biotech products. Thus, a supermajority of American workers have no way to voice their opinion collectively.
While all of the above organizations have similar reasons for opposing KORUS, CPA’s reasons include:
- Trade deficits: The trade agreement would cause worsening trade deficits. Trade deficits depress GDP growth and increase unemployment because U.S. facilities are offshored or because components and subassemblies are procured offshore. Any foreign market share achieved is overwhelmed by domestic market share ceded.
- Job loss: The trade agreement would cause job losses. Government data shows no support for a net job gain argument. Third party studies are in accord with the historical data that net job losses will result from this trade agreement.
- Non-tariff barriers: The trade agreement fails to address foreign non-tariff barrier tactics by trade rivals. These non-tariff barriers eviscerate hoped-for U.S. net export gains from tariff reductions. Currency manipulation, border adjustable taxes, state subsidies are prime examples. South Korea is a known currency manipulator. South Korea has a 10% value added tax that is charged to virtually all imports and can increase that import charge without restriction. Like China, South Korea practices a form of state managed capitalism. South Korea is not a “free trading nation,” and this agreement does not change that fact. Any concessions by South Korea are easy to negate through its pre-existing non-tariff tactics.
- Sovereignty Loss: The U.S. will be handicapped in domestic trade law enforcement. South Korea would have special rights in our trade law systems. The U.S. will be prevented from enacting tough financial industry reform, despite the need shown in the Great Recession, under these agreements. Further, hundreds foreign companies will be given special standing to challenge U.S. laws that are claimed to interfere with those companies’ investment expectations, in unaccountable foreign tribunals.
- Gateway from China/Transshipment through Korea: The South Korea trade agreement allows Chinese companies to produce 65% of a products’ value, with 35% Korean content, and still qualify for low tariff rates. China is Korea’s largest trading partner and has proven particularly aggressive in routing its products through third countries to either avoid antidumping duties or to achieve lower tariff rates. The volume of future Chinese transshipments should not be underestimated.
- Food and product safety: The U.S. border control, food safety and product safety agencies will be hampered in verifying that imported food and other products are safe. The inspections of imported products are nearly non-existent. Yet U.S. companies must fully comply with food and product safety rules.
On the other hand, the organizations and companies comprising the U.S.-Korea FTA Business Coalition that strongly supports Congressional approval of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement includes but is not limited to: American Insurance Association, Boeing Company, Caterpillar, Inc., Chevron, Citigroup, Inc., Entertainment Industry Coalition for Free Trade, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, FedEx Express, Johnson & Johnson, Motion Picture Association of America, National Association of Manufacturers, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, National Pork Producers Council, MetLife, Microsoft Corporation, Pfizer, Inc., QUALCOMM, Inc., Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association, SPI: The Plastics Industry Trade Association, Telecommunications Industry Association, Time Warner, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Council for International Business, and UPS.
Notice that virtually all of the above private companies have a global presence so that I refer to them as multinational globalist companies. While they may still be headquartered in the United States, they have worldwide locations and may even have re-incorporated in tax haven countries. They no longer have an inherent loyalty to the United States as American companies; instead, their loyalty is to the bottom line of their profitability.
Thus, my answer to the question posed in the title is “No, Congress shouldn’t ratify the Korea Free Trade Agreement.” If you agree with me in opposing its ratification, make your voice heard before it is too late. Contact your congressional representative or Senator and express your opinion on the Korea Free Trade Agreement. If you don’t know who your representative in Congress is, you can find out by typing in your zip code at http://www.congress.org/