Posts Tagged ‘outsourcing offshore’

Defense Department’s Globalization of Supply Chain Threatens our National Security

Tuesday, July 21st, 2015

Over three years ago, I wrote an article (May 21, 2012), about the release of the Senate Armed Services Committee report on counterfeit parts in the Department of Defense supply chain. The Committee had found over 1,800 cases of counterfeit parts in just the Air Force C-130J and C-27J cargo plane, as well as assemblies used in the Navy’s SH-60B helicopter.

To address weaknesses in the defense supply chain and to promote the adoption of aggressive counterfeit avoidance practices by the Department of Defense and the defense industry, an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 was adopted in the Senate and signed by President Obama.

Instead of implementing the requirements of the Act, it appears that DOD “has entered a new phase of its centuries-long development, the latest characterized by globalization of supply chains and the inability of U.S. defense contractors and laboratories to drive technological change” according to Richard McCormack, publisher and producer of the Manufacturing & Technology News, May 20, 2015 edition.

In this issue, McCormack reported on comments made by Bill Lynn, CEO of Finmeccanica North America and former Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2009 until 2011, at the April 29, 2015 meeting of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

The defense sector and the U.S. military have “moved from being a net exporter of technology to a net importer,” Lynn stated, adding “When their R&D budgets are combined to total a scant $3 billion (or only 1.6 percent of revenue), the five biggest defense contractors — Boeing, Lockheed, Raytheon, L3 and Northrop — would not even make the list of the top 20 global companies that invest in R&D.”

Lynn told the meeting, “Those are things where the commercial industrial base is stronger than the defense industrial base and in many ways the key to maintaining our future [defense] technology edge is to be able to import those technologies into our defense industrial base… Since many of the underlying technologies now reside outside of the United States, DOD has to figure out how to deal with foreign corporations and state-owned enterprises that hold the keys to its success.”

McCormack noted, “The Department of Defense and its major contractors are now dependent on foreign manufacturers for many of the military’s most advanced weapons systems…The defense industry is a shadow of its former self, representing less than 3.5 percent of the U.S. economy, a position that continues to decline as defense budgets reach new lows with no chance of them growing faster than the economy.”

Lynn commented that ” DOD is slowly catching up to the structural change caused by globalization of technology and supply chains. It is wrestling with the regulatory and procurement systems it has in place to monitor and conduct business with foreign suppliers, but it has little time to waste.”

One of these regulations to which he referred is the Buy American Act that was passed by Congress in 1933. It required the U.S. government to give preferential treatment to American producers in awarding of federal contracts. The Act restricted the purchase of supplies that are not domestic end products. For manufactured products, the Buy American Act used a two-part test: first, the article must be manufactured in the U.S., and second, the cost of domestic components must exceed 50 percent of the cost of all its components.

After the end of the Cold War and the subsequent Gulf War, the provisions of the “Buy American Act” were eased to allow purchasing off the shelf commercial parts (COTS) from foreign countries by the Defense Department and other government agencies if they met the same fit and function of parts made to strict military specifications. Previously, parts, assemblies, and systems were required to be substantially made in the United States or in a NATO country, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany.

In the early 1990s, most commercial parts were still being made in the United States, with some outsourcing to the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore, so this change was pretty safe. Permitting commercial parts to replace Mil. Spec. parts probably drove out of business the small companies that catered exclusively to the military and that provided traceability per Military Specifications for parts supplied to government agencies, military contractors, and subcontractors. This was all done in the name of cost savings. Now, however, most commercial electronic components and microchips are fabricated in China.

The President has authority to waive the Act in response to the provision of reciprocal treatment to U.S. producers. Under the 1979 GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Central American Free Trade Agreement, and the Korea Free Trade Agreement, access to government procurement by certain U.S. agencies of goods for the other parties to these agreements is granted.

If the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is approved, the procurement chapter would require that all companies operating in any country signing the agreement be provided access equal to domestic firms to U.S. government procurement contracts over a certain dollar threshold. To meet this requirement, the U.S. would have to agree to waive Buy America procurement policies for all companies operating in the 10 other countries.

In fact, it was reported by Reuters in January 2014 that “The Pentagon repeatedly waived laws banning Chinese-built components on U.S. weapons in order to keep the $392 billion Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 fighter program on track in 2012 and 2013, even as U.S. officials were voicing concern about China’s espionage and military buildup.

Lynn doesn’t seem to think that there is anything dangerous in allowing more foreign participation in the defense industry, saying “that changing perceptions about foreign involvement in the defense industry are similar to what happened in the U. S. auto sector…Americans and their representatives in Congress were skeptical about foreign nameplates. But as foreign auto companies started building technologies in the United States and hiring American workers, the tide turned…The politicians care about the jobs, they a\care less about the nameplate.”

It is incomprehensible to me to compare what happened to the U. S. auto industry to what is happening to the U. S. defense industry. The whole purpose of the defense industry is to protect our national sovereignty and national security. How can anyone in their right mind want to make our defense supply chain vulnerable to the foreign country, namely China, which has a written plan to replace us as the world’s super power? The Chinese are never going to bu9od plants in the U. S. to make parts for our defense supply chain. They have just stolen our technology to build up their own military power as evidenced by the “uncanny” similarity of China’s newest stealth fighter, the J-31, as well as the Chengdu J-20 fighter jet, to the F-35 Lightning II advanced fighter jet.

Does anyone believe that we will get any parts and assemblies need by our defense industry when China has decided we are so weak that we cannot stop their aggression in Asia. We are not even safe to have parts sourced in Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, or Vietnam. These countries would all be targets for takeover by China once they lose their fear and respect for U. S. naval and air power.

When President Eisenhower warned us about the military-industrial complex, little did he know that the military-industrial would be superseded by the consumer-importer complex, which has led to the virtual demise of the military-industrial complex.

Congress must act to strengthen the Buy American Act, not weaken it, eliminate the incentives for offshoring, and provide incentives for bringing manufacturing back to America. We must protect the supply chain for defense and military products and systems, so that Defense Department can fulfill its primary mission of defending our country. If we don’t, we are setting ourselves up for eventual defeat by our future enemies.

 

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Senate Report Reveals Extent of Chinese Counterfeit Parts in Defense Industry

Tuesday, May 29th, 2012

On May 21, 2012, the Senate Armed Services Committee released a report on counterfeit parts in the Department of Defense supply chain.  The Committee discovered counterfeit electronic parts from China in the Air Force’s C-130J and C-27J cargo plane, in assemblies used in the Navy’s SH-60B helicopter, and in the Navy’s P-8A surveillance plane, among 1,800 cases of bogus parts.

“The systems we rely on for national security and the protection of our military men and women depend on the performance and reliability of small, incredibly sophisticated electronic components.  Our fighter pilots rely on night vision systems enabled by transistors the size of paper clips to identify targets.  Our soldiers and Marines depend on radios ad GPS devices, and the microelectronics that make them work, to stay in contact with their units and get advance warning of threats that may be around the next corner. The failure of a single electronic part can leave a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine vulnerable at the worst possible time,” the report says. “Unfortunately, a flood of counterfeit electronic parts has made it a lot harder to prevent that from happening.”

The year-long investigation launched by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., the committee’s chairman,and Ranking Member Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., found over a million suspect counterfeit parts involved in those 1,800 cases.

“Our report outlines how this flood of counterfeit parts, overwhelmingly from China, threatens national security, the safety of our troops and American jobs,” Levin said. “It underscores China’s failure to police the blatant market in counterfeit parts – a failure China should rectify.”  The Chinese government denied visas to Committee staff to travel to mainland China as part of the Committee’s investigation.

The investigation revealed that China was the dominant source of counterfeit electronic parts ? more than 70 percent of the parts tracked were traced to China, coming from more than 650 companies.  Counterfeit parts included unauthorized copies of an authentic product and previously used parts that were made to look new and sold as new.  The parts often change hands multiple times before being bought by defense contractors, who may know little about the source of the parts they buy, the report said.

“Our committee’s report makes it abundantly clear that vulnerabilities throughout the defense supply chain allow counterfeit electronic parts to infiltrate critical U.S. military systems, risking our security and the lives of the men and women who protect it,” said McCain. “As directed by last year’s Defense Authorization bill, the Department of Defense and its contractors must attack this problem more aggressively, particularly since counterfeiters are becoming better at shielding their dangerous fakes from detection.”

In November 2012, the Committee held a hearing on the investigation’s preliminary findings.  Following that hearing, Committee Chairman Carl Levin and Ranking Member John McCain offered an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 to address weaknesses in the defense supply chain and to promote the adoption of aggressive counterfeit avoidance practices by DOD and the defense industry. The amendment was adopted in the Senate and a revised version was included in the final bill signed by President Obama on December  31, 2011.

The law requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of Department of Defense acquisition policies and systems for the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Act to:

  • establish Department-wide definitions of the terms “counterfeit” or “suspect counterfeit electronic part”
  • issue guidance regarding “training personnel, making sourcing decisions, ensuring traceability of parts, inspecting and testing parts, reporting and quarantining counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts, and taking corrective actions (including actions to recover costs…”
  • issue or revise guidance “on remedial actions to be taken in the case of a supplier who has repeatedly failed to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts or otherwise failed to exercise due diligence in the detection and avoidance of such parts, including consideration of whether to suspend or debar a supplier until such time as the supplier has effectively addressed the issues that led to such failures.”
  • require contractors or subcontractors that suspect a counterfeit part provide “a report in writing within 60 days to appropriate Government authorities and to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program
  • “establish a process for analyzing, assessing, and acting on reports of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts” that are reported.
  • Require the Secretary to revise the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to address the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The law includes provisions to help stop counterfeit electronic parts before they enter the U.S, strengthens the inspection regimen for imported parts, and gives the government wider berth in seeking assistance from the private sector in determining whether parts are authentic.  It also requires that contractors or subcontractors “obtain electronic parts that are in production or currently available in stock from the original manufacturers of the parts or their authorized dealers, or from trusted suppliers who obtain such parts exclusively from the original manufacturers of the parts or their authorized dealers manufacturers or authorized distributors.”

The investigation revealed that the defense industry also has routinely failed to report cases of suspected bogus parts.  For example, the majority of the 1,800 cases involving counterfeit parts appear to have gone unreported to the DOD or criminal authorities.  Boeing failed to report a case of a suspect counterfeit part used in the Navy’s P-8A surveillance airplane until the Senate Armed Services Committee began inquiring, the report said.  And L-3 Communications didn’t report the suspect memory chip to the Air Force until the day before the committee’s staff was scheduled to meet with the Air Force program office responsible for the program.

The Committee’s report includes detailed descriptions of how counterfeits are flooding the supply chain, risking the performance and reliability of critical defense systems. In just one example described in the report, the U.S. Air Force says that a single electronic parts supplier, Hong Dark Electronic Trade of Shenzhen, China, supplied approximately 84,000 suspect counterfeit electronic parts into the DOD supply chain. Parts from Hong Dark made it into Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) intended for the C-5AMP, C-12, and the Global Hawk.  In addition, parts from Hong Dark made it into assemblies intended for the P-3, the Special Operations Force A/MH-6M, and other military equipment, like the Excalibur (an extended range artillery projectile), the Navy Integrated Submarine Imaging System, and the Army Stryker Mobile Gun.

The Armed Services Committee reached the follow conclusions on counterfeit parts:

Conclusion 1: China is the dominant source country for counterfeit electronic parts that are infiltrating the defense supply chain.

Conclusion 2: The Chinese government has failed to take steps to stop counterfeiting operations that are carried out openly in that country.

Conclusion 3: The Department of Defense lacks knowledge of the scope and impact of counterfeit parts on critical defense systems.

Conclusion 4: The use of counterfeit electronic parts in defense systems can compromise performance and reliability, risk national security, and endanger the safety of military personnel.

Conclusion 5: Permitting contractors to recover costs incurred as a result of their own failure to detect counterfeit electronic parts does not encourage the adoption of aggressive counterfeit avoidance and detection programs.

Conclusion 6: The defense industry’s reliance on unvetted independent distributors to supply electronic parts for critical military applications results in unacceptable risks to national security and the safety of U.S. military personnel.

Conclusion 7: Weaknesses in the testing regime for electronic parts create vulnerabilities that are exploited by counterfeiters.

Conclusion 8: The defense industry routinely failed to report cases of suspect counterfeit parts, putting the integrity of the defense supply chain at risk.

Of course, China denies any culpability.  On May 25, 2012 an article appeared in China Defense News that stated, “The U.S. government has found yet another reason to ignore its own problems and bash China, this time accusing the country of compromising national security via the manufacture of counterfeit electronic components used by the U.S. military…The accuracy of the claims is questionable at best, but bigger questions should be answered first: how did counterfeit parts end up slipping into the U.S. military system in the first place? And for what purpose were the parts originally shipped for?

The U.S. has maintained a military embargo on China for 23 years. Military components and weapons aren’t supposed to be officially traded between the two countries to begin with. Taking this into consideration, the U.S. ought to find out precisely who purchased the parts and how they passed muster before accusing China of wrongdoing.”

I answered the question of how counterfeit parts ended up “slipping into the U. S. military system in the first place” in my blog article last fall, titled “What Led to the Problem of Chinese Counterfeit Parts.”  I detailed the following four main reasons for the problem of Chinese counterfeit parts:

  1. Mil. Spec. qualified components replaced by off the shelf components by allowing use of “dual use technology” of commercial components
  2. Relaxing “Buy American” requirements for Federal procurement
  3. American companies sourcing manufacturing offshore, mainly in China
  4. Rapid obsolescence of components, especially micro chips

The provisions of the National Defense Authorization for FY 2012 don’t directly address these four main reasons for the counterfeit part problem.  This is another typical example of Congressional legislation where they attempt to have their cake and eat it too by seeming to crack down on counterfeit parts while not endangering U. S. corporate investments in China.  In order not to anger their big political donors, who include some of the corporations that export our jobs to China, they place the burden of identifying and reporting counterfeit parts on contractors and subcontractors instead of addressing the root causes I have listed above.

The new Federal procurement regulations being drafted by the Department of Defense are supposed to “address the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts,” but there has been no mention of eliminating “dual use technology” of commercial parts for military/defense applications.  And, there has been no discussion of tightening or strengthening the “Buy American” requirements for Federal procurement to what they were prior to 1993.

Worst of all, there has been no action by Congress on addressing the trade and tax laws that currently incentivize American manufacturers to continue to offshore manufacturing in China and other foreign countries.  Congress must act to eliminate the incentives for offshoring and provide incentives for bringing manufacturing back to America.  Until these root causes are addressed, we will continue to have counterfeit parts slip into the military/defense procurement system and endanger the lives of our military personnel and threaten our national security.

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What Led to the Problem of Chinese Counterfeit Parts?

Tuesday, November 15th, 2011

Last week, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported that an investigation found and examined about 1800 cases of suspected counterfeit electronic parts dating from 2009 to last year, totaling about a million individual components.  Tracing the supply chain, 70% of the components came through China, where a variety of methods were used to misrepresent the parts as new and genuine.  Hearings now being conducted by Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan) and Senator John McCain (R-Arizona).

At a news conference on Monday, November 7, 2011, Sen. Carl Levin told reporters, “There’s a flood of counterfeit parts entering the defense supply chain.  It is endangering our troops and it is costing us a fortune.”

Sen. John McCain said the investigation documents the alarming “threat counterfeit parts pose to the safety of our men and women in uniform, to national security and to our economy.”  He added, “We can’t tolerate the risk of a ballistic missile interceptor failing to hit its target, a helicopter pilot unable to fire his missiles, or any other mission failure because of a counterfeit part.”

This dangerous state of affairs has taken over 20 years to develop and is a complex web of unintended consequences of seemingly innocuous changes in policies.  There are four main reasons for the problem of Chinese counterfeit components:

1.      Mil. Spec. qualified components replaced by off the shelf components

2.      “Buy American” requirements relaxed

3.      Manufacturing outsourced offshore, mainly in China

4.      Rapid obsolescence of components, especially micro chips

It all started with the scandals of the 1980s over the $600 toilet seats and $400 wrenches that President Reagan’s Defense Department, under Caspar Weinberger, was accused of wasting its money on by the Democrat-controlled Congress.

At the time, the news media ignored reasonable voices pointing out that tooling often has to be made to produce metal, plastic, rubber, and fiber glass parts in certain manufacturing processes.  This tooling cost then has to be amortized into the piece price of the part; i.e., tooling cost divided by the number of parts ordered plus piece price equals selling price. Since defense and military parts are produced in much lower volume than commercial products, the amortized tooling costs add much more to the part cost than it does for commercial parts.

The $600 toilet seat was actually a uniquely shaped, molded fiberglass shroud that fits over the toilet and had to satisfy specifications for vibration resistance, weight, and durability for the P-3C Orion antisubmarine aircraft, which went into service in 1962.  Since the airplane had been out of production for years, new tooling was required to produce the part.  The price reflected the design work and the cost of the equipment to manufacture them, and Lockheed Corp. charged $34,560 for 54 toilet covers, or $640 each.  The president of Lockheed at the time, Lawrence Kitchen, adjusted to the price to $100 each and returned $29,165.

Because of the public outcry over these scandals, the procurement regulations were changed.  The Defense Department, branches of the military, and their supply chain of vendors were allowed to purchase commercial off the shelf parts (COTS) if they met the same fit and function of parts made to strict military specifications.  In the early 1990s, most commercial parts were still being made in the United States, with some outsourcing to the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore, so this change was pretty safe.  Permitting commercial parts to replace Mil. Spec. parts probably drove out of business the small companies that catered exclusively to the military and that provided traceability, per Mil. Spec., for parts supplied to government agencies, military contractors, and subcontractors.  This was all done in the name of cost savings.  Now, however, most commercial electronic components and micro chips are fabricated in China.

Second, after the end of the Cold War and the successful conclusion of the first Gulf War, the provisions of the “Buy American Act” were eased to allow purchasing off the shelf commercial parts from foreign countries by the Defense Department and other government agencies.  Previously, parts, assemblies, and systems were required to be substantially made in the United States or in a NATO country, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany.

This led to parts being made in China as more and more American companies started to outsource manufacturing in China either by selecting Chinese companies as vendors or setting up their own manufacturing plants in China.   This trend accelerated after China received “most favored nation” status with the approval of the World Trade Organization treaty in the year 2000, and American companies started to build semiconductor wafer fab plants in China to produce micro chips.

The problem with counterfeit parts is not something new to industry – there were always a small number of rejected parts that went out the “back door” of companies to be sold on the black or “gray” markets by individual employees.  What is new is the purposeful production of counterfeit parts by a foreign government, namely, China, as a form of economic warfare and counter espionage.

Brian Toohey, president of the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), testified Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee calling counterfeit parts “a ticking time bomb.”   He added, “The catastrophic failure risk inherently found in counterfeit semiconductors places our citizens and military personnel in unreasonable peril,” said Toohey. The SIA estimates that counterfeits cost US-based semiconductor companies more than $7.5 billion a year.

EBN Editor, Barbara Jorgensen wrote in her blog, “Counterfeits have been appearing in the consumer and industrial sectors for as long as anyone can remember, but their presence in mission-critical defense equipment and military and passenger aircraft threatens lives  The efforts have a ways to go, but the dialogue between industry associations such as the SIA and the Defense Department and Justice Department are a major step in the right direction.”

Bruce Rayner, Contributing Editor, EE Times, wrote “counterfeiting is on the rise and it is getting harder to detect.  Counterfeit computer hardware, including chips, was one of the top commodities seized in 2010 by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) … up five-fold over 2009…The reason for the increase is that there’s a lot of money to be made.  Many obsolete components are in demand by the military because they need to repair very old equipment, such as 1980s-vintage fighter jets.  But the parts are no longer manufactured, and only a few authorized distributors stock the vintage components.  In some cases, the only place to buy these chips is from independent distributors or brokers who don’t have formal sourcing relationships with the original component manufacturer. They buy them over the Internet from sources they don’t know and who can’t validate their authenticity.”

The August 2011 issue of Industry Week reported, “In 2010, government agents seized fake goods totaling $188.1 million, which if genuine would have been worth $1.4 billion.  Goods from China accounted for 66% of the value of seizures by U. S. Customs and Border Protection.”  In the same article, Wes Shepherd, CEO of Channel IQ, said that the outsourcing of manufacturing in China combined with online selling “introduced the specter of counterfeiting as a much more serious problem.”

Joe O’Neill, owner of O’Neill Technologies and formerly with Intel, Samsung and Toshiba, told me in an interview, “the counterfeit problem is a product life cycle mismatch between consumer and more traditional applications, such as industrial, medical, and defense.  The life cycle of micro chips, also referred to as micro processors and controllers, are very short in the networking, computer, and telecommunications industries.  The life cycle of a cell phone model may range from six to 12 months, while industrial and military products may have a life cycle of decades.  Products for the military are a small piece of the market so there is a real problem with part obsolescence.  Availability of these parts that have been made ‘end of life’ force manufacturers to go into the Gray Market or other non-traditional sources to keep their factories supplied with parts.  There are a few companies that specialize in making obsolescent microprocessors for industrial, medical or military manufacturers by “cloning” the parts.” One such company is Innovasic, which makes the X86 series of Intel and AMD micro processors.

During the Senate hearings, part of which I watched after work, photos of bins of electronic parts were shown as Thomas Sharpe, V. P. of SMT Corporation, described visiting electronic component marketplaces in July 2008, where scrapped electronic parts were washed in rivers or left for the daily monsoon rains, dried on river banks, and collected in bins to be ready for counterfeit processing.  Counterfeiters buy used parts for pennies in the street markets of Shenzhen and other Chinese cities, re-mark them, fix broken leads and buff them up, then ship them to brokers in the West who unknowingly or knowingly sell them to other brokers or to OEMs for multiples of what they paid.

Last year, the Department of Justice’s Task Force on Intellectual Property was created specifically to prosecute counterfeiters, and last week Stephanie McCloskey was sentenced to 38 months in federal prison for her role in a scheme by VisionTech Components to import fake chips from China into the U. S. that were sold to a variety of customers including defense contractors and the military.

Until we implement more stringent procurement regulations, strengthen “Buy American” procurement regulations for defense and military components, and return more manufacturing to the United States from offshore, it will be up to manufacturers to have a system to detect and deter counterfeits.  Many defense contractors have put in place strict regimen for inspecting, testing, and reporting counterfeits, but all companies need to be vigilant by inspecting, testing, and reporting.

 

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