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Chinese Innovation Mercantilism is Hurting American Manufacturers

Tuesday, December 11th, 2012

On Wednesday, December 5, 2012, Robert D. Atkinson, President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), testified before the House Science Committee Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight in a hearing on “The Impact of International Technology Transfer on American Research and Development.” His testimony was based on his book, Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage (Yale University Press, 2012) and the ITIF report, “Enough is Enough:  Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism,” released February 2012.

Atkinson began his testimony by stating, “A nation’s investments in research and development (R&D) are vital to its ability to develop the next-generation technologies, products, and services that keep a country and its firms competitive in global markets. Until recently, corporate R&D was generally not very mobile, certainly not in comparison to manufacturing. But in a “flat world” companies can increasingly locate R&D activities anywhere skilled researchers are located…. the United States has seen its relative competitive advantage in R&D and advanced technology industries decline. While the United States still leads the world in aggregate R&D dollars invested, on a per-capita basis it is falling behind.”

He testified that the “decline in America’s innovative edge is due to a number of factors, not the least of which are failures of federal policy, such as an unwillingness to make permanent and expand the R&D tax credit, limitations on high-skill immigration, and stagnant federal funding for R&D. But the decline is also related to unfair practices by other nations that collectively ITIF has termed as ‘innovation mercantilism.’”

The ITIF report cited above states that these policies “include currency manipulation, relatively high tariffs (three times higher than U.S. tariffs), and tax incentives for exports.” In addition, “some policies help Chinese firms while discriminating against foreign establishments in China. These policies include “discriminatory government procurement; controls on foreign purchases designed to force technology transfer to China; land grants and rent subsidies to Chinese-owned firms; preferential loans from banks; tax incentives for Chinese-owned firms; cash subsidies; benefits to state-owned enterprises; generous export financing; government-sanctioned monopolies; a weak and discriminatory patent system; joint-venture requirements; forced technology transfer; intellectual property theft; cyber-espionage to steal intellectual property (IP); domestic technology standards; direct discrimination against foreign firms; limits on imports and sales by foreign firms; onerous regulatory certification requirements; and limiting exports of critical materials in order to deny foreign firms key inputs.”

The report explains that “in the last decade China has accumulated $3.2 trillion worth of foreign exchange reserves and now enjoys the world’s largest current account balance. In 2011, it ran a $276.5 billion trade surplus with the United States. This ‘accomplishment’ stems largely from the fact that China is practicing economic mercantilism on an unprecedented scale. China seeks not merely competitive advantage, but absolute advantage. In other words, China’s strategy is to win in virtually all industries, especially advanced technology products and services… China’s policies represent a departure from traditional competition and international trade norms. Autarky [a policy of national self-sufficiency], not trade, defines China’s goal. As such China’s economic strategy consists of two main objectives: 1) develop and support all industries that can expand exports, especially higher value-added ones, and reduce imports; 2) and do this in a way that ensures that Chinese-owned firms win.”

The report states that “because China is so large and because its distortive mercantilist policies are so extensive, these policies have done significant damage to the United States and other economies…The theft of intellectual property and forced technology transfer reduce revenues going to innovators, making it more difficult for them to reinvest in R&D. The manipulation of standards and other import restrictions balkanizes global markets, keeping them smaller than they otherwise would be, thereby raising global production costs…if Chinese policies continue to be based on absolute advantage and mercantilism…the results will be more of the same: the loss of U.S. industrial and high-tech output, and the jobs and GDP growth that go with it.”

Chinese mercantilist policies are unprecedented in their scope and size. Atkinson testified, “A principal arrow in China’s innovation mercantilist quiver is to force requirements on foreign companies with respect to intellectual property, technology transfer, or domestic sourcing of production as a condition of market access. While China’s accession agreement to the WTO contains rules forbidding it from tying foreign direct investment to requirements to transfer technology to the country, the rules are largely ignored.”

He added, “Rather than doing the hard work to build its domestic technology industries, or better yet focus on raising productivity in low-producing Chinese industries, China decided it would be much easier and faster simply to take the technology from foreign companies… China’s government unabashedly forces multinational companies in technology-based industries—including IT, air transportation, power generation, high-speed rail, agricultural sciences, and electric automobiles—to share their technologies with Chinese state-owned or influenced enterprises as a condition of operating in the country.”

The ITIF report explains that in 2006, “China made the strategic decision to shift to a “China Inc.” development model focused on helping Chinese firms, often at the expense of foreign firms. Chinese leaders decided that attracting commodity-based production facilities from multinational corporations (MNCs) was no longer the goal…The path to prosperity and autonomy was now to be ‘indigenous innovation’…”

The document “advocating this shift was ‘The Guidelines for the Implementation of the National Medium- and Long-term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)’…to ‘create an environment for encouraging innovation independently, promote enterprises to become the main body of making technological innovation and strive to build an innovative-type country.’”

Some 402 technologies, from intelligent automobiles to integrated circuits to high performance computers were included so that China could seek the capability to master virtually all advanced technologies, with the focus on Chinese firms gaining those capabilities through indigenous innovation.

However, China is not alone in trying to force the transfer of technology and R&D from foreign multinationals ? Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Portugal, and Venezuela have the same goal.

Why do so many nations engine in innovation mercantilism? Atkinson testified that there are two principle reasons. “First, these nations have embraced a particular and fundamentally limited model of economic growth that holds that the best way to grow an economy is through exports and shifting production to higher-value (e.g., innovation-based) production. Moreover, they don’t want to wait the 20 to 50 years it will take to naturally move up the value chain through actions like improving education, research capabilities, and infrastructure, as nations like the United States did. They want to get there now and the only way to do this is to short-circuit the process through innovation mercantilism. This explains much of China’s economic policies. The Chinese know that to achieve the level of technological sophistication and innovation that America enjoys will take them at least half a century if they rely on only their own internal actions. So they are intent on stealing and pressuring as much of American (and other advanced nations’) technology as they can to their own companies. If you can’t build it, steal it, is their modus operendi.”

Atkinson added that the second reason why these nations do this is because they don’t believe in the rule of law and the principles of free trade like Western nations and much of Europe do. These nations also “work on the ‘guilt’ of Western, developed nations. The narrative goes like this: the West has used its imperialist powers to gain its wealth, including at the expense of poor, developing nations and now it wants to “pull the ladder” up after it. This means turning a blind eye to intellectual property and giving our technology, including pharmaceutical drugs, to nations almost for free. After all, we are rich and they are poor because we are rich.”

The reality is that forced technology transfer is enabling China and other nations to gain global market share. It is doing “considerable harm to U.S. technology companies and to the U.S. economy, if for no other reason than reducing their profits and ability to reinvest in the next wave of innovation.”

Atkinson posed the question, “So what should the U.S. government do? He responded that “this is a difficult question because if there were easy solutions, they would have been done by now.” He recommended the following actions:

  • Try to do more through conventional trade dispute channels and expand funding for the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office (USTR) so it can do more.
  • Ensure that future bilateral trade and investment treaties (BIT) contain strong and enforceable provisions against forced technology and R&D transfer.
  • Congress should make it clear that it will not judge any administration by whether a BIT with China is concluded, but rather by if the United States made a strong effort to conclude a treaty that provided full protection against mercantilist practices like forced transfer of R&D.
  • Congress should pass legislation that allows firms to ask the Department of Justice for an exemption to coordinate actions regarding technology transfer and investment to other nations.
  • Congress should exclude mercantilists from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

Finally, he recommended that the United States actively explore alternatives to the WTO and  pursue a two-pronged trade strategy, continuing as best it can to improve conventional trade organizations like the WTO, but also creating alternative “play-by-the-rules” clubs of like-minded countries.

He concluded his testimony stating, “Pressured or mandatory technology transfer by other nations has, is, and will continue to negatively impact American R&D and innovation capabilities. It’s time for the federal government to step up its actions to fight this corrosive mercantilist practice.”

Curbing Chinese mercantilism must become a key priority of our trade policy if we want to address this serious threat to American manufacturers and the U. S. economy.

 

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Posted in Economy, Innovation, Manufacturing, National security, Outsourcing, Trade | 2 Comments »

“Lame Duck” Congress Must Act to Prevent Sequestration

Tuesday, November 6th, 2012

The clock is ticking ? only 55 more days until sequestration takes effect on January 2, 2013. For the uninformed, sequestration is the across the board 10 percent cut in discretionary spending in the budget, including the Department of Defense budget, that is mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011. The mandatory entitlement spending of the federal budget, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, will continue to grow, along with the interest on the national debt.

If Congress is unable to reach a compromise on how to reduce our 16 trillion dollar national debt, over $500 billion dollars in cuts to the defense budget over the next decade would be mandated to start January 2nd, translating into a cut of about $55-60 billion for 2013.

Our government took drastic action to prevent the bankruptcy of General Motors, but the effect of sequestration would be like both General Motors and Ford going bankrupt. It would not only affect all of the major defense prime contractors, but would affect their subcontractors, and in turn, their vendors, all the way down to the bottom of the defense and military supply chain. The lower tiers of the supply chain are nearly all small businesses, many of them disadvantaged businesses in the minority, veteran, or women-owned categories.

After three and a half years of a weak recovery, the last thing we need is a drastic cut in defense and military spending. In many regions of the country, defense and military spending has been the major factor in helping a region to recover. My hometown of San Diego is one of these regions that would be impacted severely.

According to the San Diego Military Advisory Council (SDMAC) 2012 Economic Impact Study, “a total of $20.6 billion of direct spending related to defense was estimated to flow into San Diego County during fiscal year 2012,” and “the military sector is responsible for 311,000 of the region’s total jobs in 2012 after accounting for all of the ripple effects of defense spending. This represents one out of every four jobs in San Diego.”

“Defense?related activities and spending were predicted to generate $32 billion of gross regional product (GRP) for San Diego County in fiscal year 2012,” more than the total economic output estimated for Colorado Springs, Colorado, or El Paso, Texas.

The report states that “dollars linked to national security enter San Diego through three primary channels: wages and benefits for active duty and civilian workers; benefits for retirees and veterans; and direct spending on contracts, grants, and small purchases” by the military and other Department of Defense (DoD) agencies. San Diego will not be immune to planned cutbacks in troop levels and spending by the DoD. The Marine Corps is expected to see its size gradually reduced over the next five years primarily through attrition and a reduction in recruiting, but the number of Navy personnel based in San Diego is projected to increase in fiscal year 2013 with the return of a second aircraft carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan, and the potential addition of a third aircraft carrier.

In the San Diego region, the manufacturing industry is the largest business sector that provides goods and services to the military. One-third of all companies reported some dependency on the defense industry. Over 1,700 companies of the San Diego companies profiled on the Connectory.com database of primary industries reported that military and government contracts make up a portion of their market share, so “an orchestrated approach to future defense downsizing and its impact on the manufacturing sector is needed.”

Larry Blumberg, SDMAC Executive Director, states, sequestration is “a mindless way of doing business.” The 2013 Defense budget “submitted to Congress on February of this year was designed to provide the resources to support the National Defense Strategy which was released in January 2013. Across the Board cuts to the Defense Budget make the Strategy “Un-Executable”, which is not in our National best interests.”

Nearly all of the major defense prime contractors ? BAE Systems, Boeing, General Dynamics, General Atomics, Lockheed-Martin, Northrop Grumman, and United Technologies ? have a presence in the San Diego region.

According to an editorial by the president of the National Defense Industry Association, Lawrence Farrell Jr., about “$22 billion of the sequester cut of $54 billion for fiscal year 2013 will come from operations and maintenance accounts. About $21 billion of the reductions will be from investments in new weapons systems and technology.” He also wrote, “With or without sequester, the near term reality for defense is military forces will be smaller, and weapons a bit older unless planned acquisition catches up with aging systems. Every branch of the military needs to modernize their aging fleets.”

On Aug. 6, 2012, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said, “I’ve made clear, and I’ll continue to do so, that if sequestration is allowed to go into effect, it’ll be a disaster for national defense and it would be a disaster, frankly, for defense communities as well…Panetta called sequestration “an indiscriminate formula” that was never meant to take effect. “ It was never designed to be implemented,” he said. “It was designed to trigger such untold damage that it would force people to do the right thing. He urged the defense community leaders to do what they can to ensure Congress reaches a solution that avoids sequestration.”

On September 21, 2012, Sen. John McCain, ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee and committee Chairman Carl Levin and four other Republican and Democratic senators sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D., Nev.) and Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) urging their party leaders to find a way to avert the spending cuts slated to begin Jan. 2, 2013 to “send a strong signal of our bipartisan determination to avoid or delay sequestration and the resulting major damage to our national security, vital domestic priorities and our economy.’’

In an August 2012 article titled “A Smarter Way to Trim the Pentagon Budget” Charles Knight, co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, stated, “There are numerous ways to save defense dollars that avoid both institutional disruption and most of the economic pain associated with deep cuts to government spending. An illustrative option is the “Reasonable Defense” plan, which will soon be released in its entirety by the Project on Defense Alternatives.” The Project on Defense Alternatives is a think tank which promotes consideration of a broad range of defense options and advocates resetting America’s defense posture along more sustainable, cost-effective lines.

The plan would decrease the 2013 defense budget by only $30 billion vs. $55 billion, comparable to the 2006 defense budget adjusted for inflation, and the reduction over a 10 year period would be more gradual than the Budget Control Act cap on defense spending. Key points of the plan are:

  • The Reasonable Defense budget for ten years would cost $560 billion less than the 2013 plan submitted by the White House.
  • Over the course of ten years the White House plan is to provide the Pentagon with $5.76 trillion.
  • The Reasonable Defense budget would provide the Pentagon with $5.2 trillion over tenyears.
  • The Budget Control Act would cap defense at about $5.18 trillion.

While this plan mitigates the pain of cutting the defense budget over the next ten years, even sequestration will not solve the overall budget deficit problem. “Defense {spending} today is around 3 percent of GDP, the lowest since 2001, and comprises about 18.5 percent of federal spending, which is on par with the 20-year average.” Our deficit has been more than $1 trillion per year for the past four years, and sequestration would only cut $1.2 trillion over ten years. Yet, defense spending cuts would comprise more than 50 percent of the cuts.

The best way to solve the deficit problem is to bring manufacturing back from offshore to create higher-paying jobs for more Americans. It’s simple:  Americans with good-paying manufacturing jobs pay taxes and generate tax revenue for the government, while Americans without jobs cost the government money in the form of unemployment benefits, Medicaid, and food stamps. If we could bring back half of the 5.5 million jobs we have lost, we could reduce the federal budget deficit significantly, as well as reduce state and local budget deficits. Harry Moser of the Reshoring Initiative states that the top reasons to reshore are:

  • Brings jobs back to the U.S.
  • Helps balance U.S., state and local budgets
  • Motivates recruits to enter the skilled manufacturing workforce
  • Strengthens the defense industrial base

Regardless of the outcome of the election, the members of the “lame duck” Congress must act like statesmen instead of the intensely partisan politicians of the past several years to prevent sequestration. Call your U. S. Senator and Congressional representative to urge them to approve a budget that will prevent sequestration. Otherwise, one of  the companies that close or the jobs lost may be your own.

 

 

 

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Posted in Economy, Manufacturing, National security, Reshoring | No Comments »

ITIF Report Details 50 Policies to Improve U.S. Manufacturing Competitiveness

Tuesday, September 25th, 2012

Last week, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) released a report titled, “Fifty Ways to Leave Your Competitiveness Woes Behind: A National Traded Sector Competitiveness Strategy,” by Stephen Ezell and Robert Atkinson in which they stated, “A comprehensive strategy aimed at strengthening U.S. establishments competing in global markets is needed for the United States to boost short-term recovery and long-term prosperity…”

“The United States is increasingly isolated in its belief that countries don’t compete with one another and that only firms compete” said ITIF Senior Analyst Stephen Ezell, co-author of the report. “Our traded sector establishments are up against competitors that are aided in countless ways by their governments. It’s time to level the playing field.”

The report, presents 50 federal-level policy recommendations to help restore U.S. traded sector competitiveness, along with 13 state-level recommendations. The recommendations are organized around federal policies regarding the “4Ts” of technology, tax, trade, and talent, as well as policies to increase access to capital, reform regulations, and better assess U.S. traded sector competitiveness.

A nation’s traded sector includes industries such as manufacturing, software, engineering and design services, music, movies, video games, farming, and mining, which compete in international marketplaces and whose output is sold at least in part to nonresidents of the nation. They are the core engine of U.S. economic growth and face unique challenges.

Because these industries face competition in the global market that non-traded, local-serving industries (retail trade or personal services) do not, their success is riskier. “The health of U.S. traded sector enterprises in industries such as semiconductors, software, machine tools, or automobiles—all far more exposed to global competition than local-serving firms and industries—cannot be taken for granted.”

If a company like Boeing loses market share to Airbus, thousands of domestic jobs at Boeing, its suppliers, and the companies at which their employees spend money will be lost. In contrast, a local grocery store may compete for business with other supermarkets, but it is not threatened by international competition. If Safeway loses market share to Wal-Mart, the jobs remain in the United States.

Ezell and Atkinson state, “The fact that the U.S. traded sector has not created a single net new job in 20 years is a core reason for the current U.S. economic malaise.” They cite the research of Nobel Prize-winning economist Michael Spence, who has demonstrated that “from 1990 until the Great Recession started in 2007, the U.S. achieved virtually no growth in traded sector jobs. The malaise has been a downright decline in manufacturing, as the United States lost nearly one-third of its manufacturing workforce in the previous decade, saw on net over 66,000 manufacturing establishments close, accrued a trade deficit in manufactured products of over $4 trillion, and experienced a decline in manufacturing output of 11 percent at a time when U.S. GDP increased by 11 percent (when measured properly).”

Ezell and Atkinson corroborate what I have written previously ? “every lost manufacturing job has meant the loss of an additional two to three jobs throughout the rest of the economy. The 32 percent loss of manufacturing jobs was a central cause of the country’s anemic overall job performance during the previous decade, when the U.S. economy produced, on net, no new jobs….at the rate of growth in manufacturing jobs that occurred in 2011, it would take until at least 2020 for employment to return to where the economy was in terms of manufacturing jobs at the end of 2007.”

The reasons why the authors emphasize the importance of manufacturing as a “traded sector” are:

  • It will be difficult for the U. S. to balance its foreign trade without a robust manufacturing sector because manufacturing accounts for 86 percent of U.S. goods exports and 60 percent of total U.S. exports.
  • Manufacturing remains a key source of jobs that both pay well.
  • Each manufacturing job supports as an average of 2.9 other jobs in the economy.
  • The average wages in U.S. high technology are 86 percent higher than the average of other private sector wages.
  • Manufacturing, R&D, and innovation go hand-in-hand.
  • The manufacturing sector accounts for 72 percent of all private sector R&D spending.
  • Manufacturing employs 63 percent of domestic scientists and engineers.
  • U.S. manufacturing firms demonstrate almost three times the rate of innovation as U.S. services firms.
  • Manufacturing is vital to U.S. national security and defense.

They contend that “the engines of a nation’s competitiveness are in fact not mom and pop small businesses, but rather firms in traded sectors, high-growth entrepreneurial companies, and U.S.-headquartered multinational corporations. Although such firms comprise far less than 1 percent of U.S. companies, they account for about 19 percent of private-sector jobs, 25 percent of private-sector wages, 48 percent of goods exports, and 74 percent of nonpublic R&D investment. And, since 1990, they have been responsible for 41 percent of the nation’s increase in private labor productivity.”

The report notes that “traded sector businesses improve the local economy in three ways:

  1. Traded sector businesses bring money into a region by selling to people and businesses outside the region.
  2. They help keep local money at home through import substitution, which occurs when local residents and businesses purchase locally produced products instead of importing goods and services.
  3. They improve economic equity since “their productivity and market size tends to lead them to offer higher wage levels” and “jobs at traded sector companies help anchor a region’s middle class employment base by providing stable, living wage jobs for residents.”

While the authors believe all 50 recommendations are needed, they believe the 10 most critical recommendations are:

  1. Create a network of 25 “Engineering and Manufacturing Institutes” performing applied R&D across a range of advanced technologies.
  2. Support the designation of at least 20 U.S. “manufacturing universities.”
  3. Increase funding for the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP).
  4. Increase R&D tax credit generosity and make the R&D tax credit permanent.
  5. Institute an investment tax credit on purchases of new capital equipment and software.
  6. Develop a national trade strategy and increase funding for U.S. trade policymaking and enforcement agencies.
  7. Fully fund a nationwide manufacturing skills standards initiative.
  8. Expand high-skill immigration, particularly which focuses on the traded sector.
  9. Transform Fannie Mae into an industrial bank.
  10. Require the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to incorporate a “competitiveness screen” in its review of federal regulations.

Only two of their top 10 recommendations made the list of the most critical recommendations in the second edition of my book:  # 4 and # 10. However, I support all of their other top 10 recommendations, as well as many of their other 40 recommendations, especially the following:

  • Lower the effective U. S. corporate tax rate – As of April 1, 2012 (when Japan lowered its corporate tax rate), the United States took the mantle of having the highest statutory corporate tax rate at almost 39 percent (when state and federal rates are combined) of any OECD nation.
  • Combat foreign currency manipulation
  • Better support and align trade promotion programs to boost U. S. exports.
  • Better promote reshoring.

I also support their recommendation that Congress should broaden the R&D tax credit’s scope to make it clear that process R&D (R&D to develop better ways of making things) qualifies for the tax incentive and that Congress should expand the R&D credit to allow expenditures on employee training to count as qualified expenditures.

With regard to trade enforcement, they recommend that the U. S. “exclude mercantilist countries from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)” because “the top 20 GSP-beneficiary countries — Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela—are on the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Watch List (which documents countries that fail to adequately protect U.S. companies’ or individuals’ intellectual property rights).”

I believe that enacting legislation to address foreign currency manipulation by China in particular should be in their top 10 recommendations. I also recommend that we enact legislation to establish either a Natural Strategic Tariff as recommended by economist Ian Fletcher in his book Free Trade Doesn’t Work:  What Should Replace It and Why, or a Balanced Trade Restoration Act to authorize sale of Import Certificates using either the Warren Buffet plan or the Richmans plan (as explained in their book Trading Away our Future).

I completely disagree with their recommendation to “Forge new trade agreements, including a high-standard Trans-Pacific Partnership and Trans-Atlantic Partnership.” As documented by Alan Uke in his book, Buying Back America, the U. S. has a trade deficit with nearly every single one of the countries with which it has a trade agreement. In fact, the U. S. has a trade deficit with 66 countries, the most egregious being the $278 billion deficit with China. Remember the touted benefits of NAFTA with Canada and Mexico? Well, in 2010, we had a trade deficit with Canada of $28 billion and $66 billion with Mexico. Do we want to increase our current trade deficit by adding more trading partners?

Additionally, the report articulates four key themes that the authors believe should be viewed as essential components of a U.S. traded sector competitiveness strategy. They recommend that the following key themes must be embraced by U.S. policymakers if the United States is to restore its traded sector competitiveness (summarized):

  1. The federal government must place strategic focus on its traded sectors, because it simply can’t rely entirely on its non-traded sectors to sustainably power the U.S. economy.
  2. The United States needs become much more of an engineering economy because gains from engineering-based innovation are capturable and appropriable within nations.
  3. The United States must move toward an economic system more focused on production than consumption, giving short-term consumption less priority in our politics.
  4. The structure of the global trading system must be seriously restructured to ensure that it is a trading system based on market-oriented principles and not the “innovation mercantilism” that has risen in the last decade, which fundamentally hurts the U.S. competitive position while violating the spirit and often the letter of the World Trade Organization.

Beyond federal policies to support traded sector competitiveness as a nation, the report also includes a section on recommended policies that states should implement to bolster their competitiveness, and in turn, the competitiveness of the broader U.S. economy. The state policy recommendations utilize the same “4Ts” framework as the federal recommendations.

Ezell and Atkinson state, “Implementing the policies recommended in this report will make the United States a more attractive investment environment for traded sector enterprises and their establishments. The technology policies will help spur innovation in advanced manufacturing, upgrade the technology capacity of manufacturing and other traded sector firms, help restore America’s industrial commons, and support the productivity, innovation, and competitiveness of traded sector SMEs. The tax policies will stimulate a favorable climate for private sector investment by making the overall U.S. corporate tax code more competitive with that of other nations and also by leveraging tax policy to incent private sector R&D and investment.”

In conclusion, they urge that U.S. policymakers understand that “manufacturing is not some low-value-added industry to be cavalierly abandoned.” Manufacturing is vital to U.S. competitiveness. I highly recommend reading all of this comprehensive, well-researched, well-documented report to be able to evaluate all of their recommendations and benefit from the details that are the basis for each recommendation.

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Posted in Economy, Manufacturing, National security, Outsourcing, Reshoring, Taxes/Regulations, Trade | No Comments »

Senate Report Reveals Extent of Chinese Counterfeit Parts in Defense Industry

Tuesday, May 29th, 2012

On May 21, 2012, the Senate Armed Services Committee released a report on counterfeit parts in the Department of Defense supply chain.  The Committee discovered counterfeit electronic parts from China in the Air Force’s C-130J and C-27J cargo plane, in assemblies used in the Navy’s SH-60B helicopter, and in the Navy’s P-8A surveillance plane, among 1,800 cases of bogus parts.

“The systems we rely on for national security and the protection of our military men and women depend on the performance and reliability of small, incredibly sophisticated electronic components.  Our fighter pilots rely on night vision systems enabled by transistors the size of paper clips to identify targets.  Our soldiers and Marines depend on radios ad GPS devices, and the microelectronics that make them work, to stay in contact with their units and get advance warning of threats that may be around the next corner. The failure of a single electronic part can leave a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine vulnerable at the worst possible time,” the report says. “Unfortunately, a flood of counterfeit electronic parts has made it a lot harder to prevent that from happening.”

The year-long investigation launched by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., the committee’s chairman,and Ranking Member Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., found over a million suspect counterfeit parts involved in those 1,800 cases.

“Our report outlines how this flood of counterfeit parts, overwhelmingly from China, threatens national security, the safety of our troops and American jobs,” Levin said. “It underscores China’s failure to police the blatant market in counterfeit parts – a failure China should rectify.”  The Chinese government denied visas to Committee staff to travel to mainland China as part of the Committee’s investigation.

The investigation revealed that China was the dominant source of counterfeit electronic parts ? more than 70 percent of the parts tracked were traced to China, coming from more than 650 companies.  Counterfeit parts included unauthorized copies of an authentic product and previously used parts that were made to look new and sold as new.  The parts often change hands multiple times before being bought by defense contractors, who may know little about the source of the parts they buy, the report said.

“Our committee’s report makes it abundantly clear that vulnerabilities throughout the defense supply chain allow counterfeit electronic parts to infiltrate critical U.S. military systems, risking our security and the lives of the men and women who protect it,” said McCain. “As directed by last year’s Defense Authorization bill, the Department of Defense and its contractors must attack this problem more aggressively, particularly since counterfeiters are becoming better at shielding their dangerous fakes from detection.”

In November 2012, the Committee held a hearing on the investigation’s preliminary findings.  Following that hearing, Committee Chairman Carl Levin and Ranking Member John McCain offered an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 to address weaknesses in the defense supply chain and to promote the adoption of aggressive counterfeit avoidance practices by DOD and the defense industry. The amendment was adopted in the Senate and a revised version was included in the final bill signed by President Obama on December  31, 2011.

The law requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of Department of Defense acquisition policies and systems for the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Act to:

  • establish Department-wide definitions of the terms “counterfeit” or “suspect counterfeit electronic part”
  • issue guidance regarding “training personnel, making sourcing decisions, ensuring traceability of parts, inspecting and testing parts, reporting and quarantining counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts, and taking corrective actions (including actions to recover costs…”
  • issue or revise guidance “on remedial actions to be taken in the case of a supplier who has repeatedly failed to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts or otherwise failed to exercise due diligence in the detection and avoidance of such parts, including consideration of whether to suspend or debar a supplier until such time as the supplier has effectively addressed the issues that led to such failures.”
  • require contractors or subcontractors that suspect a counterfeit part provide “a report in writing within 60 days to appropriate Government authorities and to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program
  • “establish a process for analyzing, assessing, and acting on reports of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts” that are reported.
  • Require the Secretary to revise the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to address the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The law includes provisions to help stop counterfeit electronic parts before they enter the U.S, strengthens the inspection regimen for imported parts, and gives the government wider berth in seeking assistance from the private sector in determining whether parts are authentic.  It also requires that contractors or subcontractors “obtain electronic parts that are in production or currently available in stock from the original manufacturers of the parts or their authorized dealers, or from trusted suppliers who obtain such parts exclusively from the original manufacturers of the parts or their authorized dealers manufacturers or authorized distributors.”

The investigation revealed that the defense industry also has routinely failed to report cases of suspected bogus parts.  For example, the majority of the 1,800 cases involving counterfeit parts appear to have gone unreported to the DOD or criminal authorities.  Boeing failed to report a case of a suspect counterfeit part used in the Navy’s P-8A surveillance airplane until the Senate Armed Services Committee began inquiring, the report said.  And L-3 Communications didn’t report the suspect memory chip to the Air Force until the day before the committee’s staff was scheduled to meet with the Air Force program office responsible for the program.

The Committee’s report includes detailed descriptions of how counterfeits are flooding the supply chain, risking the performance and reliability of critical defense systems. In just one example described in the report, the U.S. Air Force says that a single electronic parts supplier, Hong Dark Electronic Trade of Shenzhen, China, supplied approximately 84,000 suspect counterfeit electronic parts into the DOD supply chain. Parts from Hong Dark made it into Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) intended for the C-5AMP, C-12, and the Global Hawk.  In addition, parts from Hong Dark made it into assemblies intended for the P-3, the Special Operations Force A/MH-6M, and other military equipment, like the Excalibur (an extended range artillery projectile), the Navy Integrated Submarine Imaging System, and the Army Stryker Mobile Gun.

The Armed Services Committee reached the follow conclusions on counterfeit parts:

Conclusion 1: China is the dominant source country for counterfeit electronic parts that are infiltrating the defense supply chain.

Conclusion 2: The Chinese government has failed to take steps to stop counterfeiting operations that are carried out openly in that country.

Conclusion 3: The Department of Defense lacks knowledge of the scope and impact of counterfeit parts on critical defense systems.

Conclusion 4: The use of counterfeit electronic parts in defense systems can compromise performance and reliability, risk national security, and endanger the safety of military personnel.

Conclusion 5: Permitting contractors to recover costs incurred as a result of their own failure to detect counterfeit electronic parts does not encourage the adoption of aggressive counterfeit avoidance and detection programs.

Conclusion 6: The defense industry’s reliance on unvetted independent distributors to supply electronic parts for critical military applications results in unacceptable risks to national security and the safety of U.S. military personnel.

Conclusion 7: Weaknesses in the testing regime for electronic parts create vulnerabilities that are exploited by counterfeiters.

Conclusion 8: The defense industry routinely failed to report cases of suspect counterfeit parts, putting the integrity of the defense supply chain at risk.

Of course, China denies any culpability.  On May 25, 2012 an article appeared in China Defense News that stated, “The U.S. government has found yet another reason to ignore its own problems and bash China, this time accusing the country of compromising national security via the manufacture of counterfeit electronic components used by the U.S. military…The accuracy of the claims is questionable at best, but bigger questions should be answered first: how did counterfeit parts end up slipping into the U.S. military system in the first place? And for what purpose were the parts originally shipped for?

The U.S. has maintained a military embargo on China for 23 years. Military components and weapons aren’t supposed to be officially traded between the two countries to begin with. Taking this into consideration, the U.S. ought to find out precisely who purchased the parts and how they passed muster before accusing China of wrongdoing.”

I answered the question of how counterfeit parts ended up “slipping into the U. S. military system in the first place” in my blog article last fall, titled “What Led to the Problem of Chinese Counterfeit Parts.”  I detailed the following four main reasons for the problem of Chinese counterfeit parts:

  1. Mil. Spec. qualified components replaced by off the shelf components by allowing use of “dual use technology” of commercial components
  2. Relaxing “Buy American” requirements for Federal procurement
  3. American companies sourcing manufacturing offshore, mainly in China
  4. Rapid obsolescence of components, especially micro chips

The provisions of the National Defense Authorization for FY 2012 don’t directly address these four main reasons for the counterfeit part problem.  This is another typical example of Congressional legislation where they attempt to have their cake and eat it too by seeming to crack down on counterfeit parts while not endangering U. S. corporate investments in China.  In order not to anger their big political donors, who include some of the corporations that export our jobs to China, they place the burden of identifying and reporting counterfeit parts on contractors and subcontractors instead of addressing the root causes I have listed above.

The new Federal procurement regulations being drafted by the Department of Defense are supposed to “address the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts,” but there has been no mention of eliminating “dual use technology” of commercial parts for military/defense applications.  And, there has been no discussion of tightening or strengthening the “Buy American” requirements for Federal procurement to what they were prior to 1993.

Worst of all, there has been no action by Congress on addressing the trade and tax laws that currently incentivize American manufacturers to continue to offshore manufacturing in China and other foreign countries.  Congress must act to eliminate the incentives for offshoring and provide incentives for bringing manufacturing back to America.  Until these root causes are addressed, we will continue to have counterfeit parts slip into the military/defense procurement system and endanger the lives of our military personnel and threaten our national security.

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Death by China is a Global Call to Action to Confront the Dragon

Tuesday, May 1st, 2012

Every once in a while a book comes along that puts all the pieces into a complete picture.  The well-written, easy-to-read book, Death by China, is one such book, and the picture it portrays is both revolting and frightening.   For too long, our business and political leaders have kowtowed to China, and the consequences have been disastrous.  The response of most American economists and government leaders’ to the economic imperialism of China has been either naïveté, cowardice, or sheer stupidity.  As a result, we Americans now face the risk of losing our national sovereignty, freedom, and way of life.  But the whole world is in danger, both from a political and environmental viewpoint.

In the first chapter, “It’s Not China Bashing if It’s True,” co-authors Peter Navarro and Greg Autry portray the grim picture of the many tactics China uses to conduct unrestricted economic war against the United States in order to achieve its written goal of becoming the world’s super power of the 21st Century.

They write, “Even as thousands literally die from this onslaught of Chinese junk and poison, the American economy and its workers are suffering a no-less-painful ‘death to the American manufacturing base.’”  They corroborate the shrinking of the manufacturing industry that I wrote about in my book:  “America’s apparel, textile, and wood furniture industries have shrunk to half their size ? with textile jobs alone beaten down by 70%.” And, “other critical industries like chemicals, paper, steel, and tires are under similar siege.”

Navarro and Autry point out that as a consequence of China’s becoming the world’s “’factory floor,’ it must consume half of the world’s cement, nearly half of its steel, one-third of its copper, and a third of its aluminum.”  Even more alarming is the fact that “by the year 2035, China’s oil demand alone will exceed that of total oil production today for the entire world.”

To feed its voracious appetite for the world’s natural resources, China is practicing its own brand of colonialism that beings with a “Mephistophelean bargain:  lavish, low-interest loans to build up the country’s infrastructure in exchange for raw materials and access to local markets.”

The second chapter goes into detail on “death by Chinese poison.”  I’ve been careful in avoiding “made in China” products in the grocery store, but was horrified to find out that Chinese farmers produce 60% of our apple juice concentrate, 50% of our garlic, and a significant amount of “everything from canned pears and preserved mushrooms to honey and royal bee jelly.”

If that doesn’t make you sick enough thinking about how much mercury and other poisons you are accumulating in your body from eating these products, consider the fact that China now “produces 70% of the world’s penicillin, 50% of its aspirin, and 33% of its Tylenol.  Chinese drug companies have also captured much of the world market you in antibiotics, enzymes, primary amino acids, and vitamins. China has even cornered the world market for vitamin C — with 90% of market share ? even as it plays a dominant role in the production of vitamins A, B12, and E, besides many of the raw ingredients that go into multivitamins.”

While some of the poisons are accidental results of shoddy production methods, unsanitary processing, or soil toxicity due to a polluted environment, others are simply a way to boost profits by Chinese “’black hearts’ ? a term used by their own countrymen” ? to purposely increase their profits. Their retelling of stories you’ve read in the news will make you sick:

Melamine added to human and pet food products to increase protein levels, the adulteration of the life-saving anticoagulant drug Heparin, and lead and cadmium used in making toys and jewelry.  In addition, China is now “the world’s leading source of farm-raised fish and dominates the markets for catfish, tilapia, shrimp, and eel.”   It was horrifying to learn that China’s fish ponds are filled with water so polluted that it would be equivalent to sewer water in the U. S. and the Chinese put poultry cages over the ponds so that the fish can feed on poultry droppings.

This is why “Chinese foods and drugs always rank #1 of those flagged down at the border or recalled by both the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the European Food Safety Authority.”  The authors point out that the “U. S. Food and Drug Administration is so grossly understaffed that although it regulates 80% of America’s food supply, it only inspects less than 1% of food imports.”

In the third chapter, the authors go on to “regale you with tale after tale of the myriad Chinese products that can sicken, maim, or kill you” so that you will be  become motivated to “call, write, or e-mail your Congressional representatives.”  They urge “all of us to stand up just like Peter Finch did in the movie Network and shout, “We’re mad as hell, and we won’t buy your ‘Chinese junk’ anymore.”

The book moves on in chapter 4 to explain how China uses “Weapons of Job Destruction” to gut the manufacturing industries in the United States.  Navarro and Autry specifically illustrate how the Chinese bureaucracy systematically targets American industries to take over market share and destroy their competition.  They explain how the Chinese Communist Party seeks to achieve economic imperialism through its “eight pillars”:

1. An elaborate web of illegal export subsidies;

2. A cleverly manipulated and grossly undervalued currency;

3. The blatant counterfeiting, piracy, and outright theft of America’s intellectual property 4. Engaging in massive environmental damage;

5. Ultra-lax worker health and safety standards;

6. Unlawful tariffs, quotas, and other export restrictions;

7. Predatory pricing and practices to push foreign rivals out of key resource markets and then gouge consumers with monopoly pricing;

8. “Great Walls of Protectionism” — to keep all foreign competitors from setting up shop in China.

The next chapter provides an explanation of how China uses the second pillar of currency manipulation, followed by the chapter, “Death by American Corporate Turncoat:  When Greenbacks Trump the Red, White, and Blue” describing how corporations offshored their manufacturing to reduce costs and increase profits.  I agree with their sentiment that there seems to be “no patriotism among American corporations” as judged by the examples of General Electric, Caterpillar, Apple, and many, many others.  Their original motives may have been fear of losing market share, greed or following “herd mentality.”  However, the loss of our manufacturing base is now compounded by China’s new demand mandating “forced technology transfer” wherein “American companies must surrender their intellectual property to their Chinese partners as a condition of market entry.”   The authors point out this facilitates “the dissemination of various technologies not just to the Chinese partner directly involved but also to the Chinese government and other potential Chinese competitors” … so that “Western companies, in effect, create their own Chinese competitors virtually overnight.”

If you aren’t outraged and concerned enough by the previous chapters, chapter 8 will do the trick.  In chapter 8, “Death by Blue Water Navy,” the authors document what China has been doing with the wealth they’ve accumulated from more than a decade of huge trade deficits ? building up their military might.  Consider this:  China’s army of 2.3 million “outnumbers the combined forces of Canada, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom.”    China’s 6,700 tanks “dwarf Taiwan’s 1,100, South Korea’s 2,300, and Vietnam’s 1,000 or so,” and even the U. S. only has “about 5,000 tanks.”  Navarro and Autry label China’s Air Force as the “best that the Chinese can buy with our ‘Walmart dollars’ or that its spies can steal.”  For example, the Shenyang J-11B “is a carbon copy knockoff of the Russion Sukhoi Su-27 and the J-15 “is the equally counterfeit twin of the Russian Su-33.”

China’s build up of its Navy to challenge the U. S. Navy is even more disturbing.  The dominance of the U. S. Navy in the Pacific has been the only thing keeping Taiwan safe from being subjugated by mainland China.  Navarro and Autry write that China’s “first goal is to push U. S. aircraft carrier fleets out of the Western Pacific ? and perhaps finally take Taiwan ?  and then to ultimately project hard power across the globe.”   The Chinese even have a new missile, the Dongfeng-21D, capable of hitting “a powerfully defended moving target with pinpoint precision,” meaning that it could destroy an American aircraft carrier.

The American manufacturing industry was responsible for producing the goods and equipment that enabled the U. S. to win WWII and defeat the Soviet Empire in the Cold War.  But, now the “factory floor” of the world is in China, and the U. S. no longer has the capacity to ramp up to produce enough of the goods and equipment that would be needed to defend our country in a war against China.

After defining the challenges America faces in competing in the “Century of the Dragon,” Navarro and Autry conclude with an outline of a clear and achievable path for America to tame the Dragon’s onslaught.  There are recommendations for everyone from government and business leaders down to individual Americans.  In my meeting with Mr. Autry after reading his book, he told me that he believes boycotting 10% or more of Chinese products may be enough to destabilize the economy enough to topple the Communist regime. Peter Navarro is a professor at the University of California, Irvine and Greg Autry is an instructor and doctoral student at the university.  Mr. Autry also serves as Senior Economist for the American Jobs Alliance, a non-partisan, non-profit organization formed in 2011 to create and support American jobs.  The mission of AJA is:

  • To encourage and facilitate an educational curriculum that cultivates and maximizes the innate creativity that resides within every human being to ensure the United States of America perpetuates its traditional “Innovative Spirit.”
  • To encourage and facilitate a better understanding of the history and functioning of the American or National System of free enterprise and the activities necessary for its preservation.
  • To, once again, MAKE, GROW and INVENT all items that are vital for the survival of this and future generations. American firms, individuals and our government must renew our dedication to investing in, as well as, protecting our “Engine of Innovation.”  We must boldly reclaim the title of “shop floor of the world” so that all Americans can share in our increased national wealth and have better paying jobs for generations to come.

You can join me in pledging to create and support American jobs and buy a “Boycott China, Buy American” bumper sticker at http://www.americanjobsalliance.com

Death by China is a book that everyone interested in securing the future of America must read.   Sign up to keep apprised of issues/events at http://www.deathbychina.com/updates and check out the Death by China Facebook page.

Posted in Economy, Manufacturing, National security, Outsourcing | 3 Comments »

“What does the economy have to do with national security?”

Tuesday, March 20th, 2012

Most people in the United States would define national security as military readiness, homeland defense, and generally protecting American interests at home and abroad.  They don’t recognize that the economy has an effect on our national security.  This is the main purpose of the book “Economic Security:  Neglected Dimension of National Security?” edited by Dr. Sheila Ronis for the Center for Strategic Conferencing, Institute for National Strategic Studies and published by the National Defense University Press in the fall of  2011.

Other questions she considered are:  “But how does the United States remain strong? What does that mean in a world of globalization? How do we even define what national security is in such a complex and interdependent world?  Can we survive, let alone remain a superpower, if we no longer control any means of production?  If we remain a major debtor nation?  If we continue our dependence on unstable countries for our energy supplies?  If we invest insufficient amounts of our resources in research and development, science and technology?  Or if we perceive the training and education of people as a cost as opposed to an investment?”

This report was the result of a conference held on August 24–25, 2010, by the National Defense University.  The conference explored the economic element of national power.  Over two days, several keynote speakers and participants in six panel discussions explored the complexity of this subject and examined the major elements that define the economic component of national security.

The panels and keynote presentations looked at the economic element of national power from different system views, including the role of debt, the government, industrial capability, energy, science, technology, and human capital—create a systemic view of what could be done to improve an understanding of the economic element of national power. Selected papers from the conference that represent these views comprise this volume, edited by Dr. Sheila Ronis, Director of the Master of Business Administration/Master of Management Programs at Walsh College and President of The University Group, Inc., a management consulting firm and think tank specializing in strategic management, visioning, national security, and public policy.  Dr. Ronis has chaired the Vision Working Group of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in Washington, DC, which has been tasked by Congress to rewrite the National Security Act of 1947. As a Distinguished Fellow at PNSR, Dr. Ronis is responsible for the plan and processes to develop the Center for Strategic Analysis and Assessment, to provide the mechanism to conduct foresight studies and the development of the grand strategies that would follow—the kind of studies that would look at an entire system, such as the economy and its relationship to national security.

Dr. Ronis begins with a definition of national security that “can include anything that adds to the strength of the Nation,” such as “the strength of our nation’s infrastructure, our strong societal and moral codes, the rule of law, stable government, social, political, and economic institutions, and leadership.”  It also includes “our nation’s schools and educational programs to ensure a knowledgeable citizenry and lifelong learning—a must for a democracy.”  Then, it also “requires investments in science, engineering, research and development, and technological leadership. We cannot be strong without a viable way to power our cities, feed ourselves, and move from one place to another. Most of all, a strong economy is an essential ingredient of a global superpower.”  Without a strong market-based economy we would quickly lose our superpower status.  We need to have a strong base of globally competitive products and services that produce jobs. The “economy must include sound government policies to promote responsible choices and reduce our debt, and grand strategies for energy and environmental sustainability, science and technology leadership (at least in some areas), human capital capabilities, manufacturing, and the industrial base.”   “And…National security goes to the very core of how we define who we are as a people and a free society. It concerns how we view our world responsibilities.”

Dr. Ronis states that there can be no question of the need to include the economic viability of our nation as a major element of national security because “without capital, there is no business; without business, there is no profit; without profit, there are no jobs.  And without jobs, there are no taxes, and there is no military capability.  The viability of a nation’s industrial infrastructure, which provides jobs for its people, creates and distributes wealth, and leverages profits, is essential. Without jobs, the quality of peoples’ lives deteriorates to a point where society itself can disintegrate.”

Chapter one is a transcript of the comments made by opening keynote speaker David Walker, U. S. Comptroller General and head of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) from 1998 to 2008, and  Founder and CEO of the Comeback America Initiative.  When he started at the GAO, it didn’t have “a strategic, integrated, forward-looking, and outcome-based strategic plan.”  They put such a plan in place at GAO during his tenure, and he said, “It is the closest thing that exists to a strategic plan for the Federal Government, but the GAO is in the legislative branch. So we need one for the executive branch. It needs to be led by the OMB (Office of Management and Budget), and hopefully, eventually it will be.”

He stated, “Things like savings, critical infrastructure, investments in basic research, educational outcomes, and healthcare outcomes are key leading indicators, and in all of these areas, we are below average for an industrialized nation.”  He contends that if the economic element of national power is neglected and misunderstood, nothing will be more dangerous to the Nation than the national debt and its unintended consequences for generations to come.  Last year government represented 25 percent of the economy, above the recent average of 21 percent. “But if we do not reform our existing entitlement programs and other aspects of government, it will represent about 40 percent of the economy by 2040, and that does not count state and local governments.”

He stated that the composition of the budget has changed dramatically in the last four decades.  “Forty years ago, it was dominated by defense at 42 percent.  Today, it is dominated by social insurance programs, which grow faster than inflation and grow faster than the economy even when the economy is growing. Forty years ago, when Congress came to town, they got to decide how 62 percent of the budget would be spent, of which today defense is about half of the discretionary budget.  Now they decide how about 38 percent gets spent, and if we continue on our status quo, do nothing, let-it-ride policy, it will go down to 18 percent by 2040.  This obviously is an imprudent and unsustainable course.”  He points out that if you count our unfunded Social Security and Medicare debt, our total debt is $62 trillion, not the $14 trillion we hear about.  He states that if the total debt is taken into consideration, we are worse off than Spain,    and only three years away from becoming like Greece.  His arguments are alarming and are critical for policymakers and every citizen to understand.   In conclusion, he provides a common-sense approach to making the tough choices and changes we need to make before it’s too late to get our financial house in order.

In chapter two, John Morton traces the historical roots of the economy and its role in enabling the superpower status of the Nation.  Mr. Morton is a Distinguished Fellow and the Homeland Security Lead for the Project on National Security Reform. He is also the Strategic Advisor to DomesticPreparedness.com and a consultant to Gryphon Technologies. He states, “Today, America sustains that position primarily through two elements of its national power: its peerless military and its dollar currency, upon which the international monetary and economic system is largely based. A third element initially enabled that hegemony in the 1940s: the national economy—that is, the Nation’s industrial might. Much of that element is no longer present today.”  He presents a brilliant analysis of how American industry was the foundation of America’s becoming a superpower from the Civil War to the present day and how the alliance of government, science, industry, academe, and the military forged the national security establishment, later called the defense industrial base.  He proposes that the United States needs an economic grand strategy in order to continue America’s role in the world, which is based on its military and economic prowess and capability.

In chapter three, Keith Cooley explains his approach to an energy plan, which includes a grand strategy that, if enacted, will support the Nation’s future.  Mr. Cooley is Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the advisory firm Principia, LLC.  He previously was President and CEO of NextEnergy, an accelerator for alternative energy businesses and technologies. He paraphrases the International Energy Association definition of energy security as simply “the assurance of the uninterrupted supply of energy at an affordable price, while respecting environmental concerns.” His chapter addresses the notion of energy security as national security from four points of view that are, in his opinion, strategic priorities:

  • Priority 1: creating strong civic, business, and political leadership to quickly implement needed changes that assure energy and national security for this country.
  • Priority 2: developing and sustaining an alternative energy capability
  • Priority 3: migrating to alternative (sometimes called “clean”) energy sources
  • Priority 4: widespread increased dependence on domestic energy efficiency

He states, that “no 21st-century economy can be secured without a steady supply of energy. Without adequate energy to power contemporary civilization, there is no security at all.”  He concludes by urging “action on energy security issues at the highest levels of government, industry, and civic engagement. We have many examples to draw lessons from both here and abroad that can inform our actions. But we must act; we must engage. It is the only path available for our survival.”

In chapter four, Louis Infante offers his approach to energy security.  Mr. Infante is the Executive Director, Government and Military, for Ricardo, Inc., an independent automotive engineering consulting company, where he is responsible for strategy development and enactment in the military and government markets.  He advocates a National Energy Security Initiative administered by the Department of Energy (DOE) and joined by every government department with responsibilities that will be affected by energy—in essence, practically all departments.”  He describes a specific model that the U. S. could use to manage the complexities of its entire energy system. “This initiative would include mechanisms to improve the research and development policymaking decisions and strategies to make them real.”  He recommends that “U.S. leadership must overcome barriers to establishment of a national policy on energy that prescribes an endgame and the plan to achieve it.”  He concludes that “the National Energy Security Initiative will provide the coordinating efforts in planning and technology R&D that can assure success in the redevelopment of the U.S. energy system. And it can start within DOD as a first application of success.”

In chapter five, Myra Howze Shiplett, Wendy Russell, Anne M. Khademian, and Lenora Peters Gant address the complex set of issues of whether a nation can be an economic or military superpower without a plan to ensure it has people with the right knowledge and capabilities throughout its society.  They point out, “In 2010, America was “ranked 12th in the number of 24- to 35-year-olds with college degrees . . . among 36 developed nations” compared to “sixth in post-secondary educational attainment in the world among 25- to 60-year-olds.” Also, a major problem is that “Nationwide, only about 70 percent of students earn their high school diplomas” with lower rates for minority students ? “only 57.8 percent of Hispanic, 53.4 percent of African American, and 49.3 percent of American Indian and Alaska Native students.”  They discuss the five steps needed for the “Architecture of the High School Educational Future” and a new kind of graduate education that will produce “practitioners/scholars” with the skill sets needed for public service.  They conclude that “A vibrant, growing economy that provides jobs for America’s citizens is an essential component of our national security. A critical success factor for such an economy is a well-educated workforce, equipped to deal with the complexities of the 21st century…The security of our nation demands this commitment.”

In chapter six, Carmen Medina explores the many issues that surround what it means to have innovation as a major element of a nation’s economy.  Carmen Medina retired from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in February 2010 after over 30 years of service. Her last assignment was as Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), where she developed and managed CIA’s first agency-wide Lessons Learned Program. First, she explores some definitions of innovation: “technology-based that leads to new industries”, as opposed to “social innovation, which refers to changes in the way people behave,” as well as agricultural innovation, “defined as the application of knowledge of all types to achieve desired social and economic outcomes.”  She states that “The capacity for innovation has been the primary catalyst of U.S. economic growth. Indeed, capitalism essentially is built on innovation and the concept of creative destruction. Going forward, innovation will be even more critical to U.S. economic prosperity.”

She identifies a problem, stating “There is, however, no doubt that the U.S. capacity for innovation has declined in relative and absolute terms over the last 20 years or so.  Our standing has consistently declined.”  In addition, “the emergence of the BRIC economies—those of Brazil, Russia, India, and China—will fundamentally alter the world economic map by 2020.”  The conclusion of this chapter is that “It is probably impossible for the United States to have a robust economy and remain a superpower if its companies lose their ability to be innovative.

Very often, important White Papers, reports, and books are ignored by the mass news media, but this is one book that every elected official from the president down to local legislators should read.  The current situation is alarming, and we have a limited amount of time to address these issues if we want to stop our slide into becoming a third-world nation.  Manufacturing, innovation, energy security, and an educated citizenry are necessary to maintain freedom as a democratic republic.   As the report concludes, “To be successful in addressing a complex system, we need to integrate all major elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and so on… The entire world expects the United States to remain a leader. We cannot do this unless we are strong. And we cannot be strong unless we plan for and shape our future as a Nation with a sound economy.”

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China Poses Increasing Threat to U. S. Economy and National Security

Tuesday, November 29th, 2011

Last week the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission submitted their annual report to Congress.  The Commission was created on October 30, 2000, by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act of 2001.  The 418-page unclassified report reveals the increasing threat that China poses to the U. S. economy and national security, so one can only imagine how much more serious threats were detailed in the separate classified report that was also submitted.  The report covers the following areas (abbreviated):

•Proliferation Practices—The role of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons (including dual-use technologies);

• Economic Transfers—The qualitative and quantitative nature of the transfer of U. S. production activities to China, including the relocation of high technology, manufacturing, and research and development facilities, the impact of such transfers on U. S. national security, the adequacy of U. S. export control laws, and the effect of such transfers on U. S. economic security and employment;

• Energy—The effect of the large and growing economy of China on world energy supplies and the role the U. S. can play (including joint research and development efforts and technological assistance), in influencing the energy policy of China;

• U. S. Capital Markets—The extent of access to and use of U. S. capital markets by China, including whether or not existing disclosure and transparency rules are adequate to identify China companies engaged in harmful activities;

• Regional Economic and Security Impacts—The triangular economic and security relationship among the United States, [Taiwan] and China (including the military modernization and force deployments of China aimed at [Taiwan);

• U. S.–China Bilateral Programs—Science and technology programs, the degree of noncompliance by China with agreements between the U. S. and China on prison labor imports and intellectual property rights, and U. S. enforcement policies with respect to such agreements;

• World Trade Organization Compliance—The compliance of China with its accession agreement to the World Trade Organization (WTO);

• Freedom of Expression—The implications of restrictions on speech and access to information in China for its relations with the U. S. in the areas of economic and security policy.

Since it would difficult to summarize the key points of the whole report, this article only highlights the areas posing a threat to the economy and national security of the U. S.

The report states that China is now the second-largest economy in the world and the world’s largest manufacturer, surpassing the U.S. in this ranking for the first time.  Its market exceeds that of the U. S. in industries such as automobiles, mobile handsets, and personal computers.  China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown from $1.32 trillion in 2001 to a projected $5.87 trillion in 2011, representing an increase of more than 400 percent.

China continues to maintain an export-driven economy with policies that subsidize Chinese companies and undervalue their currency (renminbi or RMB).  While the RMB rose by roughly 6 percent over the last year, it is still widely believed to be undervalued by as much as 30-40 percent.  “For the first eight months of 2011, the U.S. trade deficit with China increased 9 percent over the same period in 2010.  The U.S. trade deficit with China is now more than half of the total U.S. trade deficit with the world.  In the year to date ending August 2011, the United States exported about $13.4 billion in advanced technology products to China, but imported over $81.1 billion in advanced technology products from China, for a deficit of about $67.7 billion.  This is a 17 percent increase in the advanced technology products deficit for the same period over the previous year, ending in August 2010.”

The Chinese economy and its product exports are moving up the value chain.  On a monthly basis, the U. S. now imports roughly 560 percent more advanced technology products from China than it exports to China.  Exports of low-cost, labor-intensive manufactured goods as a share of China’s total exports decreased from 37 percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2010.

“China’s foreign currency reserves are skyrocketing. A major contributor to this phenomenon is China’s continued policy of maintaining closed capital accounts.  China’s foreign currency reserves exceed $3 trillion, three times higher than the next largest holder of foreign currency reserves, Japan.”  Building currency reserves is one of the main goals of China’s predatory mercantilism trade policies.

China’s domestic money supply is becoming out of control. “Between 2000 and 2010, China’s money supply grew by 434 percent.  China’s money supply is now ten times greater than the U.S. money supply, despite the fact that China’s GDP is only one-third as large.”

The Commission reported that China assumed a more assertive role on the global stage in 2011 as shown by a more aggressive trade agenda, a push for a larger role in international institutions, and provocative moves in the South and East China Seas.  These actions are a result of China’s growing economic prominence and resource needs, as well as China’s view that the U. S. is in decline while China is ascendant.  “Chinese policies have had an impact on the       U. S., ranging from a negative effect on the economy to increased pressure from some parts of the international community for the U. S. to ensure the security of the global commons.”

Last year, the Commission highlighted China’s backsliding from market reforms in favor of an increased role of the state in the economy, which continued in 2011. “China subsidizes its state-owned enterprises to the detriment of both private Chinese firms and international competitors. The Chinese government’s special treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is of particular concern to U.S. businesses, as it can overcome comparative advantages of competitors, harming American economic interests.  China’s SOEs are also an issue of contention in government procurement, as China seeks to wall off a large portion of its economy from foreign competition.” The Commission estimates the SOE sector accounts for nearly 40 percent of China’s economy, but if the output of urban collective enterprises and government-run proportion of township and village enterprises are considered, the broadly defined state sector likely surpasses 50 percent.

China appears to be reversing the privatization reforms of the past two decades and renewing use of industrial policies aimed at creating SOEs that dominate important portions of the economy, especially in the industrial sectors reserved for the state’s control.  “The Chinese government promotes the state-owned sector with a variety of industrial policy tools, including a wide range of direct and indirect subsidies, preferential access to capital, forced technology transfer from foreign firms, and domestic procurement requirements, all intended to favor SOEs over foreign competitors.”

In 2010, the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into China jumped to $105.7 billion, up from $90 billion in 2009.  Foreign-invested enterprises were responsible for 55 percent of China’s exports and 68 percent of its trade surplus in 2010.  The value and scope of U.S.-China bilateral investment flows have expanded significantly in the past ten years.  However, U.S. direct investment in China is more than 12 times greater than Chinese direct investment in the United States.  Official U.S. statistics show that U.S. cumulative FDI in China was $60.5 billion in 2010.  What this means is that American companies and companies from other foreign countries are investing money in China through expanding, building or buying plants in China, buying equipment, and hiring workers.

On the other hand, there has been a more than 100 percent year-on-year growth of Chinese investment in the United States during the past two years.  Chinese investments have focused on manufacturing and technology, with an emphasis on brand acquisition. The report notes that some critics of China’s foreign direct investment in the U. S. contend that these investments are focused on acquiring and transferring technology to Chinese firms.  The Chinese Ministry of Commerce estimated that in 2010, cumulative Chinese FDI in the United States was $4.9 billion.

Due to the considerable government ownership of the Chinese economy, Chinese companies supplying products to the U.S. government or acquisition by Chinese companies of U.S. firms with sensitive technology or intellectual property could be harmful to U.S. national interests.  The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U. S. investigates the national security implications of mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors of U. S. assets.

In March 2011, China ratified its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011– 2015), a government-directed industrial policy that focuses on the development and expansion of seven strategic emerging industries:  new-generation information technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, advanced materials, alternative-fuel cars, energy conservation and environmental protection, alternative energy, and biotechnology.  The report predicts that China will likely continue to combine targeted investment with preferential tax and procurement policies to ensure that Chinese firms emerge as global leaders, or national champions, in these industries within the next five years.

China’s continuing lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights and indigenous innovation plans that limit government procurement to Chinese companies are problematic.  In addition, China maintains policies of forced technology transfer in violation of international trade agreements and requires the creation of joint venture companies as a condition of obtaining access to the Chinese market.

“Foreign-invested enterprises seeking to be considered for government procurement contracts or public works projects are expected to file for patents and copyrights within China in order to qualify for preferential treatment in government contracting.  Foreign affiliates risk the unintended transfer of their technology to Chinese firms if they do so, because of the nature of the Chinese intellectual property system and the lax enforcement of intellectual property laws and regulations in China.”  In 2001, China agreed to stop explicitly requiring foreign companies to surrender their technology in return for market access and investment opportunities, but the government still employs several tactics to coerce foreign firms to share trade secrets with Chinese competitors. China’s industrial policy seeks to circumvent accepted intellectual property protections and to extort technology from U.S. companies.

China continues to be one of the largest sources of counterfeit and pirated goods in the world (confirmed by the recent Senate hearings on counterfeit parts in the defense and aerospace supply chain.)  “The Chinese government itself estimates that counterfeits constitute between 15 and 20 percent of all products made in China and are equivalent to about 8 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP).  Chinese goods accounted for 53 percent of seizures of counterfeits at U.S. ports of entry in 2010, and the U.S. International Trade Commission estimates that employment in the U. S. would increase by up to 2.1 million jobs if China were to adopt an intellectual property system equivalent to that of the U. S.”

China progress in its military modernization efforts poses an increasing threat to U. S. national security.  “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is acquiring specific means to counter U.S. military capabilities and exploit U.S. weaknesses.  Since January 2011, China has conducted a flight test of its next-generation fighter aircraft, continued development of its antiship ballistic missile, and conducted a sea trial of its first aircraft carrier. These developments, when operational, will allow China to better project force throughout the region, including the far reaches of the South China Sea.”

The Commission reports that the PLA’s military strategy is designed to provide the army with the means to defeat a technologically superior opponent, such as the U.S. military. It focuses on controlling the regions surrounding China, especially the western Pacific Ocean, degrading an opponent’s technological advantages, and striking first in order to gain surprise over an enemy in the event of a conflict.  While U.S. bases in East Asia are vulnerable to PLA air and missile attacks, Japanese, Philippine, and Vietnamese bases are just as vulnerable, if not more so.

China has demonstrated progress in modernizing the PLA over the past year, and recent developments confirm that the PLA seeks to improve its capacity to project force throughout the region.  Continued improvements in China’s civil aviation capabilities, as first noted in the Commission’s 2010 Annual Report, enhance Chinese military aviation capabilities because of the close integration of China’s commercial and military aviation sectors.

Tensions continued in 2011 between China and other claimants in the South China Sea territorial disputes as well as with Japan over territory in the East China Sea.  China’s policy in the region appears driven by a desire to intimidate rather than cooperate.  Despite intermittent statements of cooperation, Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea indicates that China is unlikely to concede its sovereignty claims. Many of China’s activities in the region may constitute violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.  An implication of China’s growing assertiveness, especially its harassment and intimidation of foreign vessels, is the growing risk of escalation due to miscommunication and miscalculation. As chances of confrontation grow, so could the consequences for the U. S., especially with regard to the Philippines, with which the United States holds a mutual defense treaty.

In 2011, as in previous years, the U.S. government, foreign governments, defense contractors, commercial entities and various nongovernmental organizations experienced a substantial volume of actual and attempted network intrusions that appear to originate in China.  “Of concern to U.S. military operations, China has identified the U.S. military’s reliance on information systems as a significant vulnerability and seeks to use Chinese cyber capabilities to achieve strategic objectives and significantly degrade U.S. forces’ ability to operate.”

The report identifies China as one of the top space powers in the world today, and the implications of China’s civil and military space activities are dangerous to the U. S.  China’s leadership views all space activities through the prism of comprehensive national power, using civil space activities to promote its legitimacy in the eyes of its people, to produce spin-off benefits for other industries, and for military-related activities.  The nation’s capabilities, which are state of the art in some areas, follow from decades of substantial investment and high prioritization by China’s top leaders.  The prestige of space exploration and the national security benefits of space systems serve as primary motivators for Chinese decision makers.

China’s civil space programs have made impressive achievements over the past several decades.  “If Chinese projections hold, these programs are poised for continued accomplishments over the next ten to 15 years, such as the development of a space laboratory and eventually a space station. As part of an active lunar exploration program, China may attempt to land a man on the moon by the mid-2020s.”

China seeks new opportunities to sell satellites as well as satellite and launch services in international commercial space markets. Chinese firms’ prospects for greater success remain uncertain over the near term.  However, China’s international space-related diplomatic initiatives and their firms’ ability to offer flexible terms on sales to developing countries may provide additional opportunities.

China views all space activities in the context of ‘‘comprehensive national power.’’ This concept includes many dimensions, but military aspects are fundamental.   “PLA’s primacy in all of China’s space programs, including nominally civil activities, illustrates this emphasis.”  For example, China appears to be making great strides toward fielding regional reconnaissance-strike capabilities.  China has also continued to develop its anti- satellite capabilities, following up on its January 2007 demonstration that used a ballistic missile to destroy an obsolete Chinese weather satellite, creating thousands of pieces of space debris.  “In addition, authoritative Chinese military writings advocate attacks on space-to-ground communications links and ground-based satellite control facilities in the event of a conflict.”

“In the military sphere, China appears to seek ‘space supremacy.’  The PLA aims to implement this policy through two tracks.  First, they increasingly utilize space for the purposes of force enhancement.  The best example is China’s integration of space-based sensors and guided weapons.  Second, they seek the capabilities to deny an adversary the use of space in the event of a conflict.  To this end, China has numerous, active, counterspace weapons programs with demonstrated capabilities.”

These threats to America’s economy and national security need to be taken seriously.  Perhaps if the executives of American manufacturing companies would read this report, or at least the executive summary, they would change their minds about sourcing their R&D and manufacturing in China and investing in expanding, building or buying manufacturing plants in China.  China is no friend to the U. S. and Americans better wake up to that fact before it’s too late.

 

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